Adaptive Parametric and Nonparametric Multi-Product Pricing Via Self-Adjusting Controls by Chen, Qi (George) et al.
=rkfsbopfqv=lc=jf`efd^k=
=
 
Working Paper 
=
=
 
Adaptive Parametric and Nonparametric Multi-product 
Pricing via Self-Adjusting Controls 
 
Qi (George) Chen 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business  
University of Michigan 
 
 
Stefanus Jasin 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business  
University of Michigan 
 
 
Izak Duenyas 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business  
University of Michigan 
 
 
 
Ross School of Business Working Paper 
Working Paper No. 1258 
December 2014 
 
 
 
This work cannot be used without the author's permission.  
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the  
Social Sciences Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
ÜííéWLLëëêåKÅçãL~Äëíê~ÅíZORPPQSU=
Adaptive Parametric and Nonparametric
Multi-product Pricing via Self-Adjusting Controls
Qi (George) Chen, Stefanus Jasin, Izak Duenyas
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We study a multi-period network revenue management (RM) problem where a seller sells multiple products
made from multiple resources with nite capacity in an environment where the demand function is unknown
a priori. The objective of the seller is to jointly learn the demand and price the products to minimize his
expected revenue loss. Both the parametric and the nonparametric cases are considered in this paper. It is
widely known in the literature that the revenue loss of any pricing policy under either case is at least 
(
p
k).
However, there is a considerable gap between this lower bound and the performance bound of the best
known heuristic in the literature. To close the gap, we develop several self-adjusting heuristics with strong
performance bound. For the general parametric case, our proposed Parametric Self-adjusting Control (PSC)
attains a O(pk) revenue loss, matching the theoretical lower bound. If the parametric demand function
family further satises a well-separated condition, by taking advantage of passive learning, our proposed
Accelerated Parametric Self-adjusting Control achieves a much sharper revenue loss of O(log2 k). For the
nonparametric case, our proposed Nonparametric Self-adjusting Control (NSC) obtains a revenue loss of
O(k1=2+ logk) for any arbitrarily small  > 0 if the demand function is suciently smooth. Our results
suggest that in terms of performance, the nonparametric approach can be as robust as the parametric
approach, at least asymptotically. All the proposed heuristics are computationally very ecient and can be
used as a baseline for developing more sophisticated heuristics for large-scale problems.
Key words : Revenue management; learning; self-adjusting control; maximum likelihood estimation; spline
approximation; asymptotic analysis
1. Introduction
Revenue management (RM), which was rst implemented in the 1960s by legacy airline compa-
nies to maintain their edge in the competitive airline market, has recently become widespread in
many industries such as hospitality, fashion goods, and car rentals (Talluri and van Ryzin 2005).
The sellers in these industries face the common challenge of using a xed capacity of perishable
resources to satisfy volatile demand of products or services. If the seller fails to satisfy the demand
appropriately, a considerable amount of prot1 is at stake either due to the zero salvage value of
unused capacity or the loss of potential revenue. Given the high stakes, RM is aimed at helping
rms to make optimal decisions such that the right products are sold to the right customer at the
right time and at the right price. One type of operational leverage often employed by the sellers
is dynamic pricing: By adjusting the prices over time, the seller can eectively control the rate at
which the demand arrives so that he can better match volatile demand with the available capacity.
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Despite its potential benets (Talluri and van Ryzin 2005), the ecacy of dynamic pricing hinges
upon knowledge of how market demand responds to price adjustment, i.e., the knowledge of the
underlying demand as a function of price; this is not always accessible to the sellers. Although
many sellers have adopted sophisticated statistical methods, the estimated demand functions are
inevitably subject to estimation error, which in turn aects the quality of the sellers' pricing
decisions. The negative impact of inaccurate demand function estimation is further magnied in
practice because typical RM industries tend to have an enormous sales volume; so, small error can
potentially lead to a huge loss in revenue in absolute term. Given this limitation, the key issue
faced by most RM practitioners is how to price dynamically when the demand function is either
not perfectly known or completely unknown a priori.
This paper studies joint learning and pricing problem in a general network RM setting with mul-
tiple products and multiple capacitated resources for both the parametric and the nonparametric
demand cases. For each case, we develop a heuristic that is not only easy to implement for large
scale problems but also has a provable analytical performance bound. Our bounds signicantly
improve the performance bounds of existing heuristics in the literature.
Literature review. Our research draws on two streams of literature: the RM literature and
the statistics literature. A large body of RM literature has investigated the traditional dynamic
pricing problem when the seller knows the underlying demand function. The prevailing view is
that, even in this simple case where learning is not in play, computing an optimal pricing policy is
already computationally challenging. This is because the common technique for solving sequential
decision problems, the so-called Dynamic Program (DP), suers from the well-known curse of
dimensionality. This curse of dimensionality is exacerbated in most RM industries because the
sellers typically have to manage thousands of prices on a daily basis.2 Due to this challenge, instead
of nding the optimal pricing policy, a considerable body of existing literature has focused on
developing computationally implementable heuristics with provably good performance. (See Bitran
and Caldentey (2003) and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) for a comprehensive review of the
literature.)
Within the RM literature, some papers develop heuristics based on solving a deterministic pricing
problem, i.e., the deterministic counterpart of the original stochastic problem, which is computa-
tionally much easier to solve than the DP. This approach was rst proposed by Gallego and van
Ryzin (1994, 1997). They develop a static price control by rst solving the deterministic pricing
problem at the beginning of the selling season and then using its optimal solution throughout
the selling season subject to the available capacity. Although the proposed heuristic is easy to
implement, its drawback is also obvious: It does not utilize the progressively revealed demand real-
ization, which leaves an open room for further improvement. Indeed, one intuitively appealing idea
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that has been studied in the literature involves re-optimizing the deterministic pricing problem in
order to incorporate the progressively revealed demand realization. Maglaras and Meissner (2006)
show that the re-optimized static control (RSC) cannot perform worse than static price control
without re-optimization. However, it is not clear whether re-optimization guarantees a much better
performance. A more recent study by Jasin (2014) shows that RSC actually performs much better
than static price control. Despite this, there are still computational challenges to implement RSC
in practice. Although solving the deterministic pricing problem is much easier than solving the
DP, frequent re-optimizations of the deterministic pricing problem may not be practically feasi-
ble in some industries such as airlines and hotels. To address this concern, Jasin (2014) proposes
a self-adjusting heuristic called Linear Rate Correction (LRC) that requires only a single opti-
mization at the beginning of the selling season and autonomously updates the prices according
to some pre-specied re-optimization-free update rules throughout the remaining selling season.
Surprisingly, this simple heuristic guarantees the same performance as RSC in an asymptotic sense.
Motivated by this result, in this paper, we develop self-adjusting heuristics akin to LRC when the
demand function is unknown and show that the proposed self-adjusting heuristics achieve the best
achievable performance bounds.
To develop a joint learning and pricing heuristic, we need to incorporate a demand learning
mechanism. This requires us to use and generalize some of the standard results in the statistics
literature. The statistics literature is replete with studies that attempt to estimate an unknown
function from a family of candidate functions based on noisy observations. Depending on the
assumptions being made about the candidate function family, this research area can be further
categorized into two subelds, the parametric case and the nonparametric case, both of which
have wide applications in practice. In the parametric case, researchers typically assume that the
candidate function family can be fully characterized by a xed, nite, number of parameters (i.e.,
a parameter vector). Popular examples include the linear, exponential, and logit function fami-
lies with unknown parameters. Commonly used parametric estimation techniques include Least
Squares, Generalized Least Squares, and Maximum Likelihood (ML). (See Borovkov (1999) for
details.) Parametric models are widely used in industries where historical data is readily available
to the sellers to infer the structural form of the demand function. Unlike the parametric case, in
the nonparametric case, no information on the functional form is available. As one can imagine,
the estimation problem becomes much harder because now the seller may need to estimate the
function value at an innite number of points (i.e., all points in the domain of the function) to fully
characterize the underlying function. As the dimension of the domain increases, the estimation dif-
culty increases exponentially, which leads to another type of curse of dimensionality. Despite this
technical challenge, there are applications where the nonparametric approach is more appropriate
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than the parametric approach, e.g., the case of new product introduction where market response
to the innovative product cannot be easily inferred from historical data of similar products.
Recent works on joint learning and pricing for the capacitated RM have combined statistical
learning method with dynamic pricing heuristic. In this stream of research, the central trade-o
is between the cost of learning the demand function (exploration) and the reward of using the
optimal price computed based on the estimated demand function (exploitation). The longer the
time the seller spends on learning the demand function, the less opportunity there is for the seller
to exploit the knowledge of the newly learned demand function. On the ip side, if the exploration
time is too short, it will result in poor demand estimation, which yields highly sub-optimal prices.
The important question is how to properly balance the exploration and exploitation to yield the
maximum possible expected revenue. As mentioned earlier, even in the simpler setting with known
demand function, determining the optimal policy is already dicult, let alone nding the optimal
policy when the demand function is unknown. Hence, a more reasonable goal is to nd heuristics
that may not necessarily be optimal, but have provable good performance.
Following the standard convention in the literature, we use the revenue earned by a clairvoyant
who knows the demand function and faces no variability in demand arrival as a benchmark. Since
both the variability in demand realization and the informational uncertainty of the demand function
are not present, we can easily imagine that this benchmark always serves as an upper bound for
the expected revenue under any heuristic (e.g., Besbes and Zeevi (2012)). Indeed, it has been
shown in the literature that the revenue dierence between the benchmark and any feasible pricing
heuristic is at least 
(
p
k) for both the parametric and the nonparametric cases, where k represents
the size of the problem (see the last paragraph in x2 for more details). This result naturally
raises the following questions: (1) Is the lower bound on revenue loss actually tight? (2) Does
knowing the functional form of demand have a big impact on revenue performance (i.e., is there
a performance dierence between the parametric and the nonparametric approaches)? We want
to highlight here that most existing literature on joint learning and pricing has focused primarily
on the setting of a single-leg RM (single product and single resource). Besbes and Zeevi (2009)
is among the rst to investigate this problem under both the parametric and the nonparametric
cases. Their heuristic for the parametric case yields a revenue loss of O(k2=3 log0:5 k) whereas their
heuristic for the nonparametric case guarantees a revenue loss of O(k3=4 log0:5 k). This suggests
that there is a considerable gap between the performance of the parametric approach and the
nonparametric approach. Recent works by Wang et al. (2014) and Lei et al. (2014) have managed
to signicantly shrink this gap; they develop sophisticated nonparametric heuristics that guarantee
a O(pk log4:5 k) and O(pk) revenue loss, respectively. Thus, for the setting of single-leg RM,
existing works in the literature have not only managed to completely close the gap between the
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performance of the parametric and the nonparametric approaches, at least in the asymptotic sense,
but also shown that the theoretical lower bound of 
(
p
k) is tight.
The network RM problem with multiple products and multiple resources is signicantly more
challenging than the single-leg RM. To the best of our knowledge, the only existing literature
that addresses the joint learning and pricing problem in the setting of network RM is Besbes and
Zeevi (2012). They consider the nonparametric case only and show that the performance bound
of their proposed heuristic is O(k(n+2)=(n+3) log0:5 k), where n is the number of products. Observe
that the fraction (n+ 2)=(n+ 3) in the bound highlights the curse of dimensionality for network
RM since the performance bound quickly deteriorates as the number of products n increases.
If, however, the true demand function is suciently smooth (e.g., innitely dierentiable), they
show that it is possible to construct a nonparametric heuristic that guarantees a O(k2=3+ log0:5 k)
revenue loss for some  > 0 that can be arbitrarily small. Thus, the best known nonparametric
heuristic for the general network RM setting in the literature has a performance guarantee no
better than O(k2=3 log0:5 k). As one can see, there is still a considerable gap between the lower
bound of 
(
p
k) and the performance bound of O(k2=3 log0:5 k). It is then not clear whether, in
the general network RM, the lower bound can actually be attained by any heuristic (including the
parametric approach), and whether there is an inevitable performance gap between the parametric
approach and the nonparametric approach. We address these questions in our paper.
Proposed heuristics and our contributions. In this paper, we develop several heuristics for
the capacitated joint learning and pricing problem for both the parametric and the nonparametric
cases. Our heuristics combine statistical demand learning with a self-adjusting heuristic that is
based on a heuristic in Jasin (2014) for the known demand setting. Our contributions are as follows:
1. For the parametric case, we develop a heuristic called Parametric Self-adjusting Control (PSC)
that combines Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation with self-adjusting price updates, and derive
an analytical performance bound. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper that develops
a joint learning and pricing heuristic in the network RM setting with parametric demand model.
We show that PSC is rate-optimal. To be precise, the revenue loss of PSC is O(pk) (Theorem
1), which matches the theoretical lower bound. In addition, we also show that if the parametric
demand function family satises the so-called well-separated condition, then we can outperform
the 
(
p
k) lower bound. We develop an Accelerated Parametric Self-adjusting Control (APSC), a
variation of PSC, that attains a much sharper performance bound of O(log2 k) (Theorem 2).
2. For the nonparametric case, we develop a heuristic called Nonparametric Self-adjusting Con-
trol (NSC) that combines Spline Estimation with demand linearization and self-adjusting price
6 Chen, Jasin, Duenyas: Learning
updates. We also provide an analytical performance bound. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the rst paper that introduces Spline Approximation Theory to the literature of joint learning and
pricing. We show that if the underlying demand function is suciently smooth, the revenue loss
of our heuristic is O(k1=2+ logk) for some  > 0 that can be arbitrarily small (Theorem 3). This is
the tightest bound of its kind (i.e., it signicantly improves the O(k2=3+ log0:5 k) bound of Besbes
and Zeevi (2012)) and is only slightly worse than the theoretical lower bound of 
(
p
k).
3. From the operational perspective, our results indicate that, if demand is suciently smooth,
not knowing the functional form of demand function should not hurt the performance by too
much. Since the parametric approach is subject to model mis-specication, it can potentially hurt
performance (see Figure 6 for an illustration). Thus, if the seller is not very condent about the
functional form of the demand, using a nonparametric approach may yield a more robust revenue.
In addition, we want to point out that our heuristics are computationally very easy to implement
because they only require one (or two) deterministic optimization(s) throughout the selling season.
Given the enormous complexity and scale of typical RM applications, this is an obviously appealing
feature. Needless to say, if desirable, the rms can also incorporate occasional re-optimizations
during the exploitation stage to further improve the performance of our heuristics.
4. On the technical side, aside from the analysis of self-adjusting heuristics mentioned above, our
results also contribute to the broader literature in several ways. First, for the parametric estima-
tion, we employ a geometric argument to derive a large deviation bound for multidimensional ML
estimation with non-i.i.d. observations (Lemma 4). This expands our understanding on the behav-
ior of ML estimator in non-i.i.d. observation framework. Second, for nonparametric estimation, we
approximate the demand function using a linear combination of spline basis functions and derive
a large deviation bound for this estimated demand function and its Jacobian matrix (Lemma 7).
This result extends the application of Spline Approximation Theory to the case where observations
are subject to stochastic errors. Finally, we derive a nonparametric Lipschitz-type stability result
for a class of optimization problems (Lemma 8). The proof techniques used here are of independent
interest for the perturbation analysis of potentially other classes of optimization problems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We rst formulate the problem in x2. We then
introduce our heuristics and evaluate their performances for the parametric and the nonparametric
case in x3 and x4 respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in x5. All the proofs of the results
can be found in the online appendix.
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2. Problem Formulation
Notation. The following notation will be used throughout the paper. (Other notation will be
introduced when necessary.) We denote by R, R+, and R++ the set of real, nonnegative real, and
positive real numbers respectively. For column vectors a= (a1; : : : ;an) 2 Rn; b = (b1; : : : ; bn) 2 Rn,
we denote by a  b if ai  bi for all i, and by a  b if ai > bi for all i. Similarly, we denote by
Z, Z+, and Z++ the set of integers, nonnegative integers, and positive integers respectively. We
denote by  the inner product of two vectors and by 
 the tensor product of sets or linear spaces.
We use a prime to denote the transpose of a vector or a matrix, an I to denote an identity
matrix with a proper dimension, and an e to denote a vector of ones with a proper dimension.
For any vector v = [vj] 2 Rn, jjvjjp := (
Pn
j=1 jvjjp)1=p is its p-norm (1  p 1) and, for any real
matrix M = [Mij]2Rnn, jjM jjp := supjjvjjp=1 jjMvjjp is its induced p-norm. For example, jjM jj1 =
max1jn
Pn
i=1 jMijj, jjM jj2 = the largest eigenvalue of M 0M , and jjM jj1 =max1in
Pn
j=1 jMijj.
(Note that jjM jj1 = jjM 0jj1.) For any function f :X! Y , we denote by jjf(:)jj1 := supx2X jjf(x)jj1
the innity-norm of f . We use r to denote the usual derivative operator and use a subscript to
indicate the variables with respect to which this operation is applied to. (No subscript r means
that the derivative is applied to all variables.) If f :Rn!R, then rxf = ( @f@x1 ; : : : ;
@f
@xn
); if, on the
other hand, f = (f1; : : : ;fn) :Rn!Rn, then
rxf =
264
@f1
@x1
   @fn
@x1
...
. . .
...
@f1
@xn
   @fn
@xn
375 :
Finally, we introduce some commonly used functional spaces. We denote by Cs(S) the set of
functions whose rst sth order partial derivatives are continuous on its domain S, by Ps([a; b]) the
set of single variate polynomial functions with degree s on an interval [a; b]R, e.g., P1([0;1]) is
the set of all linear functions on the interval [0;1].
The model. We consider the problem of a monopolist selling his products to incoming customers
during a nite selling season and aiming to maximize his total expected revenue. There are n
types of products, each of which is made up of a combination of a subset of m types of resources.
For example, in the airline setting, a product refers to a multi-ight itinerary and a resource
refers to a seat in a single-leg ight; in the hotel setting, a product refers to a multi-day stay and
a resource refers to a one-night stay at a particular room. We denote by A = [Aij] 2 Rmn the
resource consumption matrix, which characterizes the types and amounts of resources needed by
each product. To be precise, a single unit of product j requires Aij units of resource i. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the matrix A has full row rank. (If this is not the case, then
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one can apply the standard row elimination procedure to delete the redundant rows. See Jasin
(2014).) We denote by C 2Rm the vector of initial capacity levels of all resources at the beginning
of the selling season. Since, in many industries (e.g., hotels and airlines), replenishment of resources
during the selling season is either too costly or simply not feasible, following the standard model in
the literature (Gallego and van Ryzin 1997), we will assume that the seller has no opportunity to
procure additional units of resources during the selling season. In addition, we also assume without
loss of generality that the remaining resources at the end of the selling season have zero salvage
value.
We consider a discrete-time model with T decision periods, indexed by t = 1;2; :::; T . At the
beginning of period t, the seller rst decides the price pt = (pt;1; : : : ;pt;n) for his products, where pt
is chosen from a convex and compact set P =
nl=1[pl; pl]Rn of feasible price vectors. The posted
price pt, in turn, induces a demand, or sale, for one of the products with a certain probability. Here,
we implicitly assume that at most one sale for one product occurs in each period. This is without loss
of generality since we can always slice the selling season ne enough to guarantee that at most one
customer arrives in each period. Let n 1 := f(x1; : : : ;xn) 2 Rnj
Pn
i=1 xi  1, and xi  0 for all ig
denote the standard (n   1)-simplex. Let (:) : P ! n 1 denote the induced demand rate or
purchase probability vector; we also call (:) the underlying demand function3. Contrary to most
existing RM literature where it is assumed that the seller knows (:) a priori, in this paper, we
simply assume that this function can be estimated using statistical learning approaches. (In x3, we
consider the parametric case where the seller knows the functional form of (:) but its parameters
are unknown. In x4, we consider the nonparametric case where the functional form of (:) is also
not known to the seller.) Let  := f(p) : p2Pg denote the convex set of feasible demand rates
and let Dt(pt) = (Dt;1(pt); : : : ;Dt;n(pt)) denote the vector of realized demand in period t under
price pt. It should be noted that, although demands for dierent products in the same period are
not necessarily independent, demands over dierent periods are assumed to be independent (i.e.,
Dt only depends on the posted price pt in period t). By denition, we have Dt(pt) 2 D := fD 2
f0;1gn :Pnj=1Dj  1g and E [Dt(pt)] = (pt). This allows us to write Dt(pt) = (pt) + t(pt),
where t(pt) is a zero-mean random vector. For notational simplicity, whenever it is clear from
the context which price pt is being used, we will simply write Dt(pt) and t(pt) as Dt and t
respectively. The sequence ftgTt=1 will play an important role in our analysis later. Dene the
revenue function r(p) := p  (p) to be the one-period expected revenue that the seller can earn
under price p. It is typically assumed in the literature that (:) is invertible (see the regularity
assumptions below). By abuse of notation, we can then write r(p) = p (p) =  p() = r() to
emphasize the dependency of revenue on demand rate instead of on price. We make the following
regularity assumptions about (:) and r(:).
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Regularity Assumptions. There exists positive constants r, v, v such that:
R1. (:) :P ! is in C2(P) and it has an inverse function p(:) :  !P that is in C2();
R2. There exists a set of turn-o prices p1j 2 R \ f1g for j = 1; : : : ; n such that for any p =
(p1; : : : ;pn), pj = p
1
j implies that 

j (p) = 0.
R3. jjr(:)jj1  r and r(:) is strongly concave in , i.e.,  vI r2r() vI for all 2.
Assumption R1 is fairly natural and is easily satised by many demand functions, e.g., linear
demand, logit demand, and exponential demand. Assumption R2 is common in the literature. (See
Besbes and Zeevi (2009) and Wang et al. (2014).) In particular, the existence of turn-o prices p1j
allows the seller to eectively shut down the demand for any product whenever needed, e.g., in the
case of stock-out. As for Assumption R3, the boundedness of r(:) follows from the compactness
of  and the smoothness of r
(:). The strong concavity of r(:) as a function of  is a standard
assumption in the literature and is satised by many commonly used demand functions such as
linear, exponential, and logit functions. It should be noted that although some of these functions,
such as logit, do not naturally correspond to a concave revenue function when viewed as a function
of p, they are nevertheless concave when viewed as a function of . This highlights the benet of
treating revenue as a function of demand rate instead of as a function of price. Additional regularity
assumptions will be provided later.
Admissible controls and the induced probability measures. Let D1:t := (D1;D2; : : : ;Dt)
denote the history of the demand realized up to and including period t. Let Ht denote the -eld
generated by D1:t. We dene a control  as a sequence of functions  = (1; 2; : : : ; T ), where t
is a Ht 1-measurable real function that maps the history D1:t 1 to 
nj=1[pj; pj][ fp1j g. This class
of controls is often referred to as non-anticipating controls because the decision in each period
depends only on the accumulated observations up to the beginning of the period. Under policy ,
the seller sets the price in period t equal to pt = t(D1:t 1) almost surely (a.s.). Let  denote the
set of all admissible controls. That is,
 :=
(
 :
TX
t=1
ADt(p

t )C and pt = t(Ht 1) a:s:
)
:
In this paper, we will often suppress the dependency of  on  for notational brevity. Note
that even though the seller does not know the underlying demand function, the existence of the
turn-o prices p11 ; : : : ; p
1
n guarantees that this constraint can be satised if the seller applies p
1
j
for product j as soon as the remaining capacity at hand is not sucient to produce one more unit
of product j. Let Pt denote the induced probability measure of D1:t = d1:t under an admissible
control  2, i.e.,
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Pt (d1:t) =
tY
s=1
24 1  nX
j=1
j (p

s )
!(1 Pnj=1 ds;j) nY
j=1
j (p

s )
ds;j
35 ;
where ps = s(d1:s 1) and ds = [ds;j] 2 D for all s = 1; : : : ; t. (By denition of (:), the term
1 Pnj=1 j (ps ) can be interpreted as the probability of no-purchase in period s under price ps .)
For notational simplicity, we will write P := PT and denote by E the expectation with respect to
the probability measure P. The total expected revenue under  2 is then given by:
R = E
"
TX
t=1
pt Dt(pt )
#
:
The deterministic formulation and performance metric. It is common in the literature to
consider the deterministic analog of the dynamic pricing problem as follows:
(P) JD := max
pt2P
(
TX
t=1
r(pt) :
TX
t=1
A(pt)  C
)
;
or equivalently, (P) J
D := max
t2
(
TX
t=1
r(t) :
TX
t=1
At  C
)
:
By assumption R3, P is a convex program and is computationally easy to solve. (To avoid
triviality, we assume that P has a feasible solution.) It can be shown that J
D is in fact an upper
bound for the total expected revenue under any admissible control. That is, R  JD for all  2.
(See Besbes and Zeevi (2012) for more details.) This allows us to use JD as a benchmark to quantify
the performance of any admissible pricing control. In this paper, we follow the convention and
dene the expected revenue loss of an admissible control  2 as  := JD R. Let D denote the
optimal solution of P and let p
D = p(D) denote the corresponding optimal deterministic price.
(Since r() is strongly concave with respect to , by Jensen's inequality, it can be proved that
the optimal solution is static, i.e., t = 
D for all t.) Also, let D denote the optimal dual solution
corresponding to the capacity constraints in P. Let Ball(x; r) be a closed Euclidean ball centered
at x with radius r. We state our fourth regularity assumption below:
R4. (Interior Assumption) There exists > 0 such that Ball(pD; )P.
Assumption R4 is suciently mild. Intuitively, it states that the static price should neither be
too low that it attracts too much demand nor too high that it induces no demand. A similar interior
assumption has also been made in Jasin (2014) and Chen et al. (2014).
Asymptotic setting. As discussed in x1, most RM applications can be categorized as either
moderate or large size, i.e., the seller is selling a lot of products. Motivated by this, following the
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standard convention in the literature (e.g., Besbes and Zeevi (2009) and Wang et al. (2014)), in this
paper, we will consider a sequence of increasing problems where the length of the selling season and
the initial capacity levels are both scaled by a factor of k > 0. (One can interpret k as the size of the
problem. For example, k= 500 could correspond to a ight with capacity 500 seats and k= 5;000
could correspond to a large hotel with capacity 5,000 rooms.) To be precise, in the kth problem,
the length of the selling season and the initial capacity are given by kT and kC, respectively. The
optimal deterministic solution is still D and the optimal dual solution is still D. Let (k) denote
the expected revenue loss under an admissible control  2  for the problem with scaling factor
k. We are primarily interested in identifying the order of (k) for large k. (Intuitively, one would
expect that a better-performing control should have a revenue loss that grows relatively slowly
with respect to k.) The following notation will be used throughout the remainder of the paper. For
any two functions f : Z++ ! R and g : Z++ ! R+, we write f(k) = 
(g(k)) if there exists M > 0
independent of k such that f(k)Mg(k). Similarly, we also write f(k) = (g(k)) if there exists
M;K > 0 independent of k such that Mg(k)  f(k) Kg(k), and write f(k) = O(g(k)) if there
exists K > 0 independent of k such that f(k)Kg(k).
3. Parametric Demand Case
In this section, we consider the parametric demand case and develop two heuristics: Parametric
Self-adjusting Control (PSC) and Accelerated Parametric Self-adjusting Control (APSC). For the
general family of parametric demand, we show that PSC is rate-optimal, i.e., it guarantees a O(pk)
revenue loss. Thus, we have completely closed the gap with the theoretical lower bound of 
(
p
k).
If the parametric family of demand satises a so-called \well-separated" condition, we show that
it is possible to further improve the O(pk) bound via APSC. In what follows, we discuss the
parametric function family and its estimation procedure rst before describing the heuristics.
Parametric demand function family. Let  be a compact subset of Rq where q 2 Z++ is
the number of unknown parameters. Under the parametric demand case, the seller knows that
the underlying demand function (:) equals (:;) for some  2. Although the function (:;)
is known, the true parameter vector  is unknown and needs to be estimated from the data.
Let  := f(p;) : p 2 Pg denote the set of feasible demand rates under some parameter vector
 2 . We assume that  is convex. (It can be shown that, under the most commonly used
parametric function families such as linear, logit, and exponential demand,  is convex for all
 2.) The one-period expected revenue function is given by r(p;) := p (p;). We assume that
R1 and R3 hold not only for , but also for all  2. (See parametric family assumptions below.)
This means that the demand function (p;) is invertible; so, by abuse of notation, we can write
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r(p;) = p  (p;) =   p(;) = r(;). In addition to the regularity assumptions R1-R4, we also
need further assumptions on the parametric demand function family given below. These are all
standard assumptions in the literature and are immediately satised by commonly used demand
function families such as linear, logit and exponential.
Parametric Family Assumptions. There exist positive constants !;v; v such that for all p2P
and for all  2:
P1. (p; :) : !n 1 is in C1(). For all ;0 2, jjp(;)  p(0;)jj2  !jj 0jj2.
P2. For all 1 i; j  n, jj(p;) (p;)jj2  !jj  jj2, j@j@pi (p;) 
@j
@pi
(p;)j  !jj  jj2.
P3. R1 and R3 hold for all  2.
Similar to P and P dened in x2, we dene a deterministic pricing problem for any  2 as
(P()) JD :=max
p2P
(
TX
t=1
r(pt;) :
TX
t=1
A(pt;)C
)
;
or equivalently, (P()) J
D
 := max
t2
(
TX
t=1
r(t;) :
TX
t=1
At C
)
:
We denote by pD() (resp. D()) the optimal solution of P() (resp. P()). In addition, we
also denote by D() the optimal dual solution corresponding to the capacity constraints of P().
(Note that D() is also the optimal dual solution corresponding to the capacity constraints of
P().) Observe that P(
) is equivalent to P dened in x2 in the sense that D() = D; pD() =
pD; D() = D, and JD = J
D.
Maximum likelihood estimator. As noted earlier, the seller does not know the true parameter
vector . But, he can estimate this parameter vector using statistical methods. In this paper, we
will focus primarily on Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation. (The analysis of other statistical
methods is beyond the scope of this paper.) The behavior of ML estimator has been intensively
studied in the statistics literature. It not only has certain desirable theoretical properties, but is
also widely used in practice. To guarantee the regular behavior of ML estimator, certain statistical
conditions need to be satised. To formalize these conditions, it is convenient to rst consider the
distribution of a sequence of demand realizations when a sequence of ~q 2 Z++ xed price vectors
~p= (~p(1); ~p(2); : : : ; ~p(~q)) 2 P ~q have been applied. For all d1:~q 2D~q, we dene the distribution P~p; as
follows:
P~p;(d1:~q) =
~qY
s=1
24 1  nX
j=1
j(~p
(s);)
!(1 Pnj=1 ds;j) nY
j=1
j(~p
(s);)ds;j
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Let E~p denote the expectation with respect to P~p;. The PSC and APSC that we will develop
later use a set of \exploration prices" ~p in the rst L periods and then use maximum likelihood
estimation to estimate the demand parameters. The exploration prices that we use need to satisfy
the following conditions to guarantee the regular behavior of ML estimator:
Statistical Conditions on Exploration Prices. There exist constants 0< min < max < 1,
cf > 0, and a sequence of prices ~p= (~p
(1); : : : ; ~p(~q))2P ~q such that:
S1. P~p;(:) 6= P~p;0(:) whenever  6= 0;
S2. For all  2, 1 k ~q and 1 j  n, j(~p(k);) min and
Pn
j=1 j(~p
(k);) max.
S3. For all  2, I(~p; ) cfI where I(~p; ) := [Ii;j(~p; )]2Rqq is a q by q matrix dened as
Ii;j(~p; ) = E~p

  @
2
@i@j
logP~p;(D1:~q)

:
We call ~p the exploration prices. Some comments are in order. S1 and S2 are crucial to guarantee
that the estimation problem is well-dened, i.e., the seller is able to identify the true parameter
vector by observing sucient demand realizations under the exploration prices ~p. (If this is not
the case, then the estimation problem is ill-dened and there is no hope for learning the true
parameter vector.) The symmetric matrix I(~p; ) dened in S3 is known as the Fisher information
matrix in the literature, and it captures the amount of information that the seller obtains about the
true parameter vector using the exploration prices ~p. S3 requires the Fisher matrix to be strongly
positive denite; this is needed to guarantee that the seller's information about the underlying
parameter vector strictly increases as he observes more demand realizations under ~p. All the results
in this section require assumptions P1-P3 and S1-S3 to hold.
Remark 1. We want to point out that, given the demand function family, it is easy to nd such
exploration prices. For example, for linear and exponential demand function families, any ~q= n+1
price vectors ~p(1); : : : ; ~p(n+1) constitute a set of exploration prices if (a) they are all in the interior
of P and (b) the vectors (1; ~p(1)), . . . , (1; ~p(n+1))2Rn+1 are linearly independent. For logit demand
function family, any ~q = 2 price vectors ~p1; ~p2 constitute a set of exploration prices if (a) they are
both in the interior of P and (b) ~p(1)i 6= ~p(2)i for all i= 1; : : : ; n. The choice of exploration prices is
related to the literature of optimum experimental design. Although it is possible to \optimally"
choose the exploration prices using techniques in optimal experiment design, it is beyond the scope
of this paper. Interested readers are referred to Pzman (2013) for more details.
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3.1. General Demand Function Family
We are now ready to discuss our heuristic for the general family of parametric demand. Our main
result in this section is to show that PSC is rate-optimal, i.e., it attains the performance lower
bound. It has been repeatedly shown in the literature (e.g., Besbes and Zeevi (2012), Broder and
Rusmevichientong (2012), Wang et al. (2014)) that, in the most general setting, no admissible
pricing control can have a better performance than 
(
p
k), i.e., (k) = 
(
p
k) for all  2 .
This obviously poses a fundamental limitation on the performance of any pricing control that we
could hope for. An important question of both theoretical and practical interest is whether this
lower bound is actually tight and whether there exists an easily implementable pricing control that
guarantees a O(pk) revenue loss. In the general parametric setting with only a single product and
without capacity constraints (i.e., the uncapacitated setting), this question has been answered by
Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012). If, on the other hand, the resources have limited capacity
(i.e., the capacitated setting), Lei et al. (2014) recently propose a hybrid heuristic that guarantees
a O(pk) revenue loss. Thus, the question of the attainability of the lower bound in the single-
product setting has been completely resolved. As for the general parametric setting with multiple
products and capacity constraints, we are not aware of any result that guarantees a O(pk) revenue
loss. The heuristics analyzed in Wang et al. (2014) and Lei et al. (2014) are not easily generalizable
to multiproduct setting. (This is because their heuristics exploit the structure of the optimal
deterministic solution in the single-product setting. Unfortunately, no analogs of such structures
exist in the multiproduct setting.) Moreover, the analysis of multiproduct setting with capacity
constraints introduce new subtleties that do not previously exist in the uncapacitated setting. A
family of self-adjusting controls, i.e., Linear Rate Correction (LRC), has been shown to perform
very well in the capacitated multiproduct setting when the demand function is known to the seller
(Jasin (2014)). Motivated by this result, we will adapt LRC and develop a family of self-adjusting
controls called Parametric Self-adjusting Control (PSC) that can be employed in the unknown
demand setting. We will show that PSC attains the best achievable revenue loss bound for the
joint learning and pricing problem. We explain PSC below.
Parametric Self-adjusting Control. The idea behind PSC is to divide the selling season into
two stages: the exploration stage, where we do price experimentations using the exploration prices,
and the exploitation stage, where we apply LRC using the parameter estimate computed at the end
of the exploration stage. The exploration stage lasts for L periods (L itself is a decision variable to
be optimized) while the exploitation stage lasts for T  L periods. Let Q 2Rnn be a real matrix
satisfying AQ=A and let ^L denote the ML estimate of 
 computed at the end of the exploration
stage. For all t L+ 1, dene ^t :=Dt   (pt; ^L). Let Ct denote the remaining capacity at the
end of period t. The complete PSC procedure is given below.
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Parametric Self-adjusting Control (PSC)
Tuning Parameter: L
Stage 1 (Exploration)
a. Set exploration prices f~p(1); ~p(2); :::; ~p(~q)g. (See below.)
b. For t= 1 to L, do:
- If Ct 1  0, apply price pt = ~p(b(t 1)~q=Lc+1) in period t.
- Otherwise, for product j = 1 to n, do:
- If product j requires any resource that has been depleted, set pt;j = p
1
j .
- Otherwise, set pt;j = pt 1;j.
Stage 2 (Exploitation)
a. Compute the ML estimate ^L given p1:L and D1:L.
b. Solve the deterministic optimization P(^L).
c. For t=L+1 to T , do:
- If Ct 1  0, apply the following price in period t
pt = p
 
D(^L) 
t 1X
s=L+1
Q^s
T   s ; ^L
!
:
- Otherwise, for product j = 1 to n, do:
- If product j requires any resource that has been depleted, set pt;j = p
1
j .
- Otherwise, set pt;j = pt 1;j.
Please note that in the PSC the exploration prices that satisfy conditions S1-S3 are set as
described in Remark 1 and, as we will show below, an optimal tuning parameter for L is to set
L= dpkT e. In comparison to the original LRC, which uses pt = p(D() 
Pt 1
s=1
Qs
T s ;
)4, since
the underlying parameter vector  is not known and the sequence fsg is not observable, we
use ^L and f^sg as their substitute in PSC. Intuitively, one would expect that if ^L is suciently
close to , then PSC should retain the strong performance of LRC. This intuition, however, is
not immediately obvious. It should be noted that while LRC only deals with the impact of natural
randomness due to demand uctuations, as captured in fsg, PSC also introduces a sequence of
systematic biases due to estimation error as captured in f^sg (by denition, E[^s] 6= 0). Thus,
despite the strong performance of LRC, it is not a priori clear whether linear rate adjustments
alone, without re-optimizations and re-estimations, is sucient to reduce the impact of estimation
error on revenue loss. Interestingly, the answer is yes. In fact, PSC is rate-optimal.
Theorem 1. (Rate-Optimality of PSC) Suppose that we use L= dpkT e. Then, there exists
a constant M1 > 0 independent of k 1 such that PSC(k)M1
p
k for all k 1.
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As a comparison, if we apply the same static price pt = p
D(^L) throughout the exploitation
stage, subject to capacity constraints, then the optimal length of exploration stage is of the order
k2=3 and the resulting revenue loss is O(k2=3 log0:5 k) (Besbes and Zeevi 2009). This underscores an
important point that a simple and autonomous price update is sucient to reduce the revenue loss
from O(k2=3 log0:5 k) to O(k1=2). Let E(t) := jj  ^tjj2 and dene (t) :=E[E(t)2]1=2. The proof of
Theorem 1 depends crucially on the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. (Continuity of the Optimal Solutions) There exist constants  > 0 and  > 0
independent of k > 0, such that for all  2Ball(; ),
a. pD()2Ball(pD(); =2), Ball(pD(); =2)P and jjD() D()jj2  jj  jj2,
b. D(:) : !Rm+ is continuous at ;
c. The capacity constraints of P() that correspond to the rows fi : Di ()> 0g are binding.
Lemma 2. (Bounds for ML Estimator with I.I.D Observations) There exist positive con-
stants 1; 2; 3 independent of k > 0, such that for all  > 0, we have P(E(L)> ) 1 exp( 2L2)
and (L) 3=
p
L.
Lemma 3. (Exploitation revenue under PSC) Let  be as dened in Lemma 1. Let R^PSC(k)
denote the revenue under PSC during the exploitation stage. There exists a constant M0 > 0 inde-
pendent of L> 0 and k 3 such that for all k 3,
kTX
t=L+1
r(D();) E
h
R^PSC(k)
i
M0
"
(L)2k +
logk
1 P(E(L)> ) + L +
1+ kP
 
E(L)> 

1 P(E(L)> )
#
:
Some comments are in order. Lemma 1 tells us that the deterministic problem P(^L) is similar to
the deterministic problem P() as long as the estimate ^L is suciently close to . In particular,
the Lipschitz continuity of D() is useful to quantify the size of perturbation in the deterministic
solution as a function of the estimation error. Lemma 2 is a typical statistical result that is needed
to bound the size of the estimation error at the end of the exploration stage. Lemma 3 is the key.
It characterizes the trade-o between exploration and exploitation by establishing the impact of
the length of the exploration stage on the total revenue loss incurred during the exploitation stage;
this, in turn, helps us to determine the optimal length of the exploration stage. We want to stress:
The result of Lemma 3 is rather surprising. To see this, note that, if the true parameter vector
is misestimated by a small error , then D(^L) is roughly  away from 
D() as suggested by
Lemma 1(a). If the seller simply uses the static price pD(^L) throughout the exploitation stage, then
the one-period revenue loss is roughly r(D();)  r(D(^L);) rr(D();)  (D() 
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Table 1 Performance comparison of STA and PSC
Revenue STA PSC
k upper bd. RL(Std.) % of RL RL(Std.) % of RL
100 24970 9876 (48) 39.5% 7711 (82) 30.9%
300 74911 20133 (169) 26.9% 14323 (205) 19.1%
1000 249702 45817 (443) 18.3% 29587 (437) 11.8%
3000 749107 97342 (1080) 13.0% 55633 (896) 7.4%
10000 2497023 223564 (2855) 9.0% 110542 (2012) 4.4%
30000 7491069 459024 (6274) 6.1% 205426 (4683) 2.7%
100000 24970230 1035790 (14572) 4.1% 371655 (9497) 1.5%
300000 74910689 2174142 (31567) 2.9% 702589 (21923) 0.9%
In this numerical example, we set n= 2;m= 2, A= [1;1; 0;2];C = [1; 1]. The demand model
is a logit function, and [1(p1; p2);2(p1; p2)] = (1 + exp(4  0:015p1) + exp(8  0:02p2)) 1
[exp(4  0:015p1); exp(8  0:02p2)]. For each heuristic, we vary the scale k from 100 to 300000
and run 1000 trials for each k.
D(^L)) (), which leads to a total revenue loss of O(k). This is in contrast to the analysis
in the uncapacitated setting where rr(D();) = 0 (because in this case D() is the global
unconstrained optimizer of r(;)), and thus a smaller revenue loss of order 2 is incurred in each
period, which yields a total revenue loss of O(2k) (see Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012)). This
explains why the results in the uncapacitated setting are not directly applicable to the capacitated
setting. In PSC, we use a feedback correction mechanism (i.e., the term  Pt 1s=L+1 ^sT s) that has
the ability to mitigate the impact of systematic error  on revenue loss. To further highlight the
strength of self-adjusting price update, we report a numerical simulation in Table 1. Let STA
denote the control that uses the deterministic price in the exploitation stage instead of adjusting
prices using PSC's price update formula. (This control is the network RM version of the control
in Besbes and Zeevi (2009).) Table 1 displays the revenue loss (RL) for PSC and STA and shows
that PSC signicantly outperforms STA. Finally, it should be noted that, although our analysis
holds for all Q satisfying AQ= A, dierent choices of Q may lead to a dierent non-asymptotic
performance. In particular, from the proof of Lemma 3, it can be seen that the constant M0 is
O(1 + jjQjj22). Therefore, one approach to determine Q is to solve minfjjQjj2 : s:t: AQ=Ag. Note
that this optimization is a convex program and A is known to the seller before the selling season;
thus, the seller can solve the optimal Q o-line very eciently.
3.2. Well-Separated Demand Function Family
The joint learning and pricing problem studied in x3.1 is very general: It allows both a general
parametric demand form and an arbitrary number of unknown parameters. In this general case,
the problem is naturally hard not only because active price experimentations are costly but also
because, as it turns out, not all prices are equally informative. An example of the so-called unin-
formative price can be seen in Figure 1. Intuitively, if the seller experiments with an uninformative
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Figure 1 Illustration of uninformative prices (left) and well-separated demand family (right)
Note. For a general demand function family (left), there may be uninformative prices at which the true demand
curve and some alternative demand curves intersect. If the seller happens to use that price, he cannot statistically
distinguish the true demand function from the alternative demand functions. This pathological phenomenon does not
occur in well-separated demand function family (right).
price, then he will not be able to statistically distinguish the true demand curve from the wrong
one regardless of the choice of the estimation procedure. Indeed, as pointed out by Broder and
Rusmevichientong (2012), this is the reason why we cannot improve on the 
(
p
k) lower bound
for revenue loss in general. To guarantee a stronger performance bound than (
p
k), we need to
impose additional assumptions on the demand model. One condition that has been studied in the
literature is the so-called well-separatedness of the family of demand functions proposed by Broder
and Rusmevichientong (2012) (see Figure 1). They show that, for the case of the uncapacitated
single-product RM, if the demand function family is well-separated, the 
(
p
k) lower bound on rev-
enue loss can be reduced to 
(logk). This is a signicant improvement in terms of the potentially
achievable performance of an admissible pricing control. It is not, however, a priori clear whether
a similar result also holds in the more general network RM setting with multiple products and
capacity constraints. In what follows, we rst provide the denition of well-separatedness condition
in multidimensional parameter space, and then we discuss a heuristic called Accelerated Parametric
Self-adjusting Control (APSC), which is specically designed to address this setting.
Well-separated demand. To formalize the denition of well-separated demand, it is convenient
to rst consider the distribution of a sequence of demand realizations D1:t = d1:t under a sequence
of prices p1:t 2Pt generated by an admissible control , which is dened as
P;t (d1:t) = P
p1:t;
t (d1:t) =
tY
s=1
24 1  nX
j=1
j(p

s ;)
!(1 Pnj=1 ds;j) nY
j=1
j(p

s ;)
ds;j
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Dene W(~min; ~max) := fp 2 P :
Pn
j=1 j(p;) ~max; j(p;) ~min; j = 1; : : : ; n; for all  2g,
for some 0 < ~min < ~max < 1. We state the well-separated assumptions below. All the results in
this subsection require these additional assumptions to hold.
Well-Separated Assumptions. For any 0< ~min < ~max < 1, there exists cf > 0 such that:
W1. For all p2W(~min; ~max), Pp;(:) 6= Pp;0(:) whenever  6= 0;
W2. For all  2, p2W(~min; ~max), I(p; ) cfI for I(p; ) := [Ii;j(p; )]2Rqq dened as
[I(p; )]i;j =Ep

  @
2
@i@j
log Pp;(D)

=Ep

  @
@i
log Pp;(D)
@
@j
log Pp;(D)

:
W3. For any p1:t = (p1; : : : ; pt)2W(~min; ~max)t, log Pp1:t;t (D1:t) is concave in  on .
Assumptions W1 and W2 are the multiproduct multiparameter analogs of the well-separated
condition given in Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012). A necessary condition for W1 to hold
is that there is no \redundancy". This means that the number of products must be at least as
many as the number of the unknown parameters. If the number of products is strictly smaller
than the number of unknown parameters (i.e. n < q), then we are essentially trying to solve a
system of n equations with q unknowns, which may result in the non-uniqueness of . Note that
W2 is analogous to condition S3 and it ensures that seller's information about the parameter
vector strictly increases as he observes more demand realizations under any p2W(~min; ~max). The
last condition W3 requires the log-likelihood function to behave nicely. This is easily satised by
many commonly used demand functions such as linear, logit, and exponential demand functions.
Note that this well-separatedness condition is not overly restrictive as it permits, for example
general demand functions with unknown additive market size (i.e., for each product j, its demand
is j(p) = aj + gj(p) where the market size aj is unknown and gj : P ! [0;1] is a known function)
and general demand functions with unknown multiplicative market size (i.e., for each product j,
its demand is j(p) = ajgj(p) where the market size aj is unknown and gj : P ! [0;1] is a known
function). For more examples of well-separated demand in the single-product/single-parameter
setting, see Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012).
Passive learning with APSC. Estimating the unknown demand parameters from a family
of well-separated candidate functions is considerably much easier than estimating the unknown
parameters in the general setting. As discussed earlier, in the general parametric case, not all prices
are equally informative. In contrast, under the well-separated condition, all prices are informative.
This means that the demand data under any price will help improve the estimation, and the seller
can continue to passively learn the demand parameter vector during the exploitation stage. The
following result on ML estimation is the analog of Lemma 2 for non-i.i.d observations when the
demand function family is well-separated.
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Lemma 4. (Estimation Error of ML Estimator with Non-I.I.D Observations) Fix some
0< ~min < ~max < 1. Suppose that an admissible control  satises ps = s(D1:s 1)2W(~min; ~max)
for all 1  s  t. Then, under W1-W3, there exist constants 4; 5; 6 > 0, such that 8 >
0;P(E(t)> ) 4tq 1 exp( 5t2) and (t) 6
p
[(q  1) log t+1]=t.
Remark 2. The result derived in Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) (Theorem 4.7) can be
viewed as a special case of ours. In particular, their result holds for the single product and single
parameter setting whereas our result holds for a multidimensional setting with multiple products
and multiple parameters. Although Hellinger distance and likelihood ratio are the common argu-
ments used in deriving bounds in both results, we want to point out that the multidimensional
parameter space is more complicated. To be precise, in the single dimension case, all candidate
parameters lie on a line. Therefore, if ML estimator ^t is  away from 
, then there are only two
possibilities: Either ^t > 
 +  or ^t <    . Thus deriving the tail bound reduces to bounding
the probability that, given the observations, the likelihood of  is smaller than either of the two
points:     and  + . In contrast, in the multidimensional parameter case, if ML estimation
error is larger than , one needs to bound the probability that the likelihood of  is smaller than
any of an innite number of points that lie on the boundary of a multidimensional ball. This makes
our extension nontrivial. Another observation is that as the dimension of the parameter space
increases, the bounds deteriorate. This results in the dierent orders of regret bounds for the single
parameter and the multiple parameters cases. However, since the bounds do not deteriorate too
much, we are still able to attain a sharp performance bound for APSC when multiple parameters
need to be estimated.
Accelerated Parametric Self-adjusting Control (APSC) divides the selling season into two stages
similar to PSC: the initial exploration stage, which lasts L periods, and the exploitation stage,
which lasts T  L periods. However, unlike PSC, which stops learning the value of the underlying
parameter vector once it exits the exploration stage, APSC continues to incorporate passive learning
during its exploitation stage. To do this, APSC further divides the exploitation stage into small
segments with increasing length (see Figure 2). Let tz; z = 1; : : : ;Z + 1; be a sequence of strictly
increasing integers satisfying t1 =L; t2 =L+1, tZ+1 = T , tz =
l
tz+1 L
2
m
+L for all z = 2; : : : ;Z; and
let segment z contains all the periods in (tz; tz+1] := ftz + 1; tz + 2; :::; tz+1g. (Note that when T
and L are given, the sequence of integers is uniquely determined. It is not dicult to see that Z,
the number of segments obtained under the procedure mentioned above, satises Z  dlog2(T  
L + 1)e  dlog2 T e.) The idea is to re-estimate the parameter vector at the beginning of each
segment and use the new estimate to update the deterministic solution over time. The re-estimation
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Figure 2 Illustration of APSC
Note. In this example, the rst L periods are dedicated to exploration and the remaining periods are divided into
ve exploitation segments. The seller estimates the demand parameters and optimizes for the deterministic solution
at the beginning of period t1 + 1. The demand parameters are then re-estimated and the deterministic solution is
updated accordingly at the beginning of periods t2+1; t3+1; t4+1; t5+1.
periods are spaced in a way that updates occur more frequently during the early part of the selling
season, when our estimate is still highly inaccurate, and gradually phase out as the estimation
accuracy improves. Once the parameter estimate is updated, ideally, the seller can update his
deterministic solution by re-optimization. However, recall that frequent re-optimizations may still
be computationally challenging for large-scale RM applications. To address this concern, we propose
a re-optimization-free subroutine to update the deterministic solution at re-estimation points:
(1) At the beginning of segment 1 (i.e., the beginning of period L+ 1), solve the deterministic
optimization problem P(^1) to obtain the exact deterministic solution 
D(^1); (2) At the beginning
of segment z  2 (i.e., the beginning of period tz + 1), use Newton's method (see more details
below) to obtain an approximate solution of P(^z). Since this procedure involves some subtleties,
we discuss this subroutine below before laying out the full description of APSC.
To better explain the intuition behind the subroutine, we rst briey review Newton's method
for the multi-variate equality constrained problem. Let X be a convex set in Rn, f be a strongly
concave function, and F and G be a matrix and a vector, respectively, with a proper dimension.
We write down a nonlinear programming (NP) problem with equality constraints and its Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions below:
(NP) max
x2X
ff(x) : Fx=Gg ; (KKT) frxf(x) = F 0;Fx =Gg ;
where (x;) is the optimal pair of primal and dual solution. Since KKT conditions are both
necessary and sucient for the prescribed setting, to solve NP, we only need to solve the system
of equations characterized by the KKT to which we will apply iterative Newton's method. To be
precise, suppose that we have an approximate pair of primal and dual solution (xz;z). Then, our
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next pair of solution is given by (xz+1;z+1) = (xz;z)+(x;), where the Newton steps x and
 are characterized by the following:
rf(xz +x) = F 0(z +)
F (xz +x) = G
 rf(xz)+r
2f(xz)x = F
0z +F 0
Fxz +Fx = G
,

x


=
 r2f(xz) F 0
F 0
 1 rf(xz) F 0z
G Fxz

:
The key result for Newton's method is that it has a locally quadratic convergence rate, i.e., there
exists some positive constants  and  such that if jjxz xjj2  , then jjxz+1 xjj2  jjxz xjj22
(see Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004) for details). Our idea is to tap into this locally quadratic
convergence of Newton's method, coupled with the convergence result of ML estimator in Lemma 4,
to develop a procedure for obtaining a sequence of solutions fNTz gZz=1 that closely approximates
fD(^tz)gZz=1. To implement this, we need to approximate P(^tz) with an equality constrained
problem ECP(^tz) (to be dened shortly) so that Newton's iteration can be properly applied. Let
Ci   (AD(^t1))i denote the amount of slack for the ith capacity constraint in P(^t1) and dene
B := fi :Ci=T   (AD(^t1))i  g to be the set of potential binding constraints in P(), where 
is a threshold level to be chosen by the seller. (Since we do not know which constraints are actually
binding in P(
), we use B as our estimate. It can be shown that the constraints in B coincide with
the binding constraints in P(
) with a very high probability as k!1 if  is properly chosen.
We address how  should be chosen in Theorem 2 below.) Let B and CB denote the submatrix of
A and subvector of C with rows corresponding to the indices in B respectively. Similarly, let N
and CN denote the submatrix of A and subvector of C with rows corresponding to the indices not
in B respectively. Dene the Equality Constrained Problem (ECP) as follows:
ECP() max
x2Rn

r(x;) : Bx=
CB
T

We denote by xD() the optimal solution of ECP(). Note that if B coincides with the set of
binding constraints of P(
) at the optimal solution D(), then not only xD() coincides with
D(), but also a stability result similar to Lemma 1(a) holds: there exist positive constants ~; ~
such that for all jj  jj2  ~, jjxD()  D()jj2 = jjxD()  xD()jj2  ~jj  jj2. This means
that ECP() closely approximates P(
) when  is close to . We dene the Newton iteration for
ECP(^tz) in segment z as follows:
Newtonz(x;) :=

x+x
+

=

x


+
 R 1 B0
B O
 1 
G B0
CB  Bx

=

x


+
 R+RB0S 1BR RB0S 1
S 1BR S 1

G B0
CB  Bx

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where R= [r2r(x; ^tz)] 1, G=rr(x; ^tz), and S =BRB0. (This formula is derived using the for-
mula for Newton step in multi-variate equality constrained problem and the block matrix inversion
formula.) Let Sz := ^tz \ f 2 Rn : N  CN ;B = CBg for z = 1; : : : ;Z. We can now state the
Deterministic Price Update Procedure (DPUP) below which will be a part of the APSC described
later.
Deterministic Price Update Procedure
Tuning Parameter: 
For z = 1, do:
a. Solve P(^t1) and obtain 
D(^t1)
b. Identify B := fi :Ci=T   (AD(^t1))i  g
c. Set xNT1 := 
D(^t1), 
NT
1 = (BB
0) 1Brr(xNT1 ; ^t1), and let NT1 := xNT1 :
For z  2, do:
a. Set (xNTz ;
NT
z ) :=Newtonz(x
NT
z 1; 
NT
z 1)
b. Let NTz be the projection of x
NT
z on Sz, i.e., NTz := argmin2Sz jjxNTz  jj2
We briey explain the intuition behind DPUP. Recall that our goal is to obtain an approximate
solution for each P(^tz), z = 1; : : : ;Z, without re-optimization. Since ECP(^tz) and P(^tz) are
similar, the projection of xD(^tz) on Sz should be a very good approximation of D(^tz). Therefore,
if we can nd a good approximation of xD(^tz), say xz, then by projecting xz on Sz, we can attain
a good feasible approximation of D(^tz). This is where we need to apply Newton's method to
approximately solve each ECP(^tz). In particular, segment 1 carries out two objectives: (1) We
want to nd the set of potential binding constraints B and (2) we need to compute an initial pair of
approximate primal and dual solution (xNT1 ;
NT
1 ) to ECP(^t1). We use 
D(^t1) as our initial primal
solution xNT1 . The approximate dual solution 
NT
1 is computed using the formula proposed in Boyd
and Vandenberghe (2004). (Naturally, since rr(xD(^t1); ^t1) =B0D(^t1) must hold at the optimal
primal and dual solution of ECP(^t1), this suggests that we use 
NT
1 = (BB
0) 1Brr(xNT1 ; ^t1).)
For any later segment z > 1, we rst use (xNTz 1;
NT
z 1) as an initial feasible point for ECP(^tz) and
apply a single iteration of Newton update to obtain a much better (due to the locally quadratic
convergence of Newton's method) approximate solution (xNTz ;
NT
z ) of ECP(^tz). Then, we project
xNTz to Sz to obtain a feasible solution, NTz , to P(^tz). By doing this, we manage to replace
the full-scale re-optimization of P(^tz) into one Newton update and one projection. It should
be noted that, although it is theoretically possible to apply two (or more) iterations of Newton
update, it is asymptotically unnecessary due to the locally quadratic convergence of Newton's
method. Indeed, we show that jjxNTz   D()jj2 =(jj^tz   jj2). Thus, in light of Lemma 1(a),
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Figure 3 Geometric illustration of DPUP for segment z = 2
Note. In segment 2, step (a) is to apply Newton's method to the previous approximate solution xNT1 to obtain a
better solution to ECP(^t2), i.e., x
NT
2 . This solution may not be feasible to P(^t2), so in step (b), x
NT
2 is projected
on S2, which is a ray in this example, to obtain NT2 .
xNTz approximates 
D() as well as D(^tz) in terms of the order of approximation error. (See
Figure 3 for an illustration of DPUP.) Below, we provide the full description of APSC heuristic.
Accelerated Parametric Self-adjusting Control (APSC)
Tuning Parameters: L;
Stage 1 (Exploration)
a. Set exploration prices f~p(1); ~p(2); :::; ~p(~q)g. (See below.)
b. For t= 1 to L, do:
- If Ct 1  0, apply price pt = ~p(b(t 1)~q=Lc+1) in period t,
- Otherwise, for product j = 1 to n, do:
- If product j requires any resource that has been depleted, set pt;j = p
1
j .
- Otherwise, set pt;j = pt 1;j.
Stage 2 (Exploitation)
For time segment z = 1 to Z, do:
a. At the beginning of period tz +1, compute ML estimate ^tz
b. Use DPUP() to obtain NTz .
c. For t= tz +1 to tz+1, do:
- If Ct 1  0, apply the following price in period t
pt := p
 
NTz  
t 1X
s=t1+1
Q^s
T   s ; ^tz
!
;
- Otherwise, for product j = 1 to n, do:
- If product j requires any resource that has been depleted, set pt;j = p
1
j .
- Otherwise, set pt;j = pt 1;j.
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Please note that in APSC the exploration prices that satisfy conditions S1-S3 are set as described
in Remark 1. Moreover, under the choice of L; described in the following theorem, APSC has a
strong revenue performance as stated in the theorem below.
Theorem 2. Fix any  > 0. Suppose that we use L= d log1+(kT ) e and = log =4 k. There exists
a constant M2 > 0 independent of k  3 such that APSC(k)M2 [log1+ k+ (q   1) log2 k] for all
k 3.
Remark 3. Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) has established that, under the well-separated
case with one unknown parameter, the best achievable lower bound on the performance of any
admissible pricing control in the uncapacitated single product case is 
(logk) and this bound is
achievable by a heuristic called MLE-GREEDY. An open research question is whether this bound
is also achievable in the more general case of capacitated network RM with well-separated demand.
Our result gives a partial answer. We show that the revenue loss of APSC is worse than O(logk) by
a factor of log k. However, in the case where there is only one parameter to estimate, the revenue
loss of APSC is O(log1+ k). Since  can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, APSC almost attains
the best achievable performance bound for the special case with a single unknown parameter.
4. Nonparametric Demand Case
The results of x3 assume that the seller has a good prior knowledge of the functional form of the
demand function. Although this is a justiable assumption in many cases, in other cases such as
new product launch where no historically relevant data is available, the seller is unlikely to know
the structural form of demand. Blindly assuming a parametric demand model may be inappropriate
and could potentially result in signicant revenue loss if the parametric form is misspecied, e.g., a
seller who uses linear model to t the data generated by a logit model (see the numerical simulation
in Besbes and Zeevi (2012)). This has motivated the study of the nonparametric approach in the
literature. Recently, Wang et al. (2014) and Lei et al. (2014) propose novel nonparametric heuristics
for the single-leg RM with O(pk log4:5 k) and O(pk) revenue loss, respectively. It is, however, not
clear whether their heuristics can be extended to the network RM setting because the proposed
nonparametric controls in both Wang et al. (2014) and Lei et al. (2014) heavily exploit the simple
structure of the optimal deterministic solution for the single-leg RM problem, which cannot be
generalized to the network setting. To the best of our knowledge, the only existing work in the
literature that studies the nonparametric approach in the network setting is Besbes and Zeevi
(2012). But, the performance of their heuristic quickly deteriorates when the number of products
n is large due to the curse of dimensionality. This is a bad news for practitioners who have a
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large number of products to sell. Fortunately, not all is lost: It is known in the literature that if
the underlying demand function has some additional properties, then the curse of dimensionality
can be mitigated. For example, by exploiting the smoothness property, Besbes and Zeevi (2012)
develop a heuristic based on Local Polynomial Approximation that attains a performance bound
of O(k2=3+ log0:5 k) for any  > 0. Although this bound does not deteriorate when n is large, there
is still a considerable gap with the 
(
p
k) lower bound on revenue loss. Is it actually possible to
close this gap? Motivated by this question, in this section, we develop a nonparametric heuristic
that uses spline estimation and demand linearization for the exploration stage and then uses self-
adjusting control for the exploitation stage to further close the gap. It turns out that, if the
underlying demand function is suciently smooth, our heuristic guarantees a performance bound
of O(k1=2+ logk) for any  > 0, which almost attains the best achievable performance lower bound.
Nonparametric demand function and assumptions. Recall that we denote by (:) the
unknown demand function for the nonparametric case. Let s denote the largest integer such that@a1;:::;ani (p)
@p
a1
1 :::@p
an
n
 is uniformly bounded for all 0 a1; : : : ; an  s. We call s the smoothness index. We
make the following smoothness condition.
Nonparametric Function Smoothness Assumptions.
N1. s 2.
N2. There exists a constant W > 0 such that for all i = 1; : : : ; n and p 2 P and integers 0 
a1; : : : ; an  s,
@a1;:::;ani (p)
@p
a1
1 :::@p
an
n
W .
The above assumptions are fairly mild and are satised by most commonly used demand func-
tions, e.g., linear demand, polynomial demand with higher degree, logit demand, and exponential
demand with a bounded domain of feasible prices. Note that the smoothness index reveals how dif-
cult it is to estimate the corresponding demand function: The larger the value of s, the smoother
the demand function is, and it is easier to estimate its shape because the function value cannot
have a drastic change locally.
Spline approximation of a deterministic function. To estimate a nonparametric function
from noisy observations, we rst study a simpler problem of approximating a deterministic function.
To that end, we will use the results developed in Spline Approximation. (Although the Local Poly-
nomial Approximation used in Besbes and Zeevi (2012) also utilizes the smoothness of the demand
function to mitigate the curse of dimensionality in estimating multi-variate functions, we instead
choose to use Spline Approximation method because this approach yields a dierentiable demand
function unlike the Local Polynomial Approximation. This dierentiability not only enables a more
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ecient and stable computation for solving the deterministic optimization problem, but also facil-
itates the stability analysis of the deterministic optimization problem.) Spline functions have been
widely used in engineering to approximate complicated functions, and their popularity is primarily
due to their exibility in eectively approximating complex curve shapes. This exibility lies in
the piecewise nature of spline functions { a spline function is constructed by attaching piecewise
polynomial functions with a certain degree, and the coecients of these polynomials are com-
puted in a way such that a suciently high degree of smoothness is ensured in the places where
the polynomials connect (the points where two piecewise polynomials are attached are called the
knots). More formally, for all l 2 f1; : : : ng, let p
l
= xl;0 < xl;1   < xl;d < xl;d+1 = pl be a partition
that divides [p
i
; pi] into d+ 1 subintervals of equal length. Let G :=
nl=1Gl denote the knots grid
where Gl = fxl;igd+1i=0 . We dene the function space of tensor-product polynomial splines of order
(s; : : : ;s)2Rn with knots at points in G as S(G; s) =
nl=1Sl(Gl; s) where Sl(Gl; s) := ff 2 Cs 2[pl; pl] :
f is a single-variate polynomial of degree s  1 on each subinterval [xl;i; xl;i+1); i= 0; : : : ; d:g.
One of the key questions that the theory of Spline Approximation addresses is the following:
given an arbitrary function f that satises N1-N2 and S(G; s), nd a spline function g 2 S(G; s)
that approximates f well. Among the various approaches, one of the most popular approximations
is using the tensor-product B-Spline basis functions. This approach is based on the key observation
that S(G; s) is a linear space of dimension (d+ s)n. This implies that there exists a set of (d+ s)n
basis functions (this set is not unique), and any function in S(G; s) can be represented as a linear
combination of the basis functions. We propose to use tensor-product B-Spline basis functions,
denoted by fNi1;:::;in(x1; : : : ; xn)gs+d;:::;s+di1=1;:::;in=1, as the set of basis functions. These functions are dened
formally in the Technical Details part (a) below, and are illustrated in Figure 4. Given the basis
functions, for any spline function g 2 S(G; s), there exists a set of coecients fci1;:::;ings+d;:::;s+di1=1;:::;in=1
such that g(x) =
Ps+d
i1=1
  Ps+din=1 ci1;:::;inNi1;:::;in(x) for all x2P. Therefore, the problem of nding
g is reduced to the problem of computing the coecients for representing g, which we address
below in the Technical Details part (b). Since the procedure of spline approximation essentially
takes f as an input and outputs a function g, it can be viewed as a linear operator L : C0(P)!
S(G; s). Lemma 5 highlights some useful properties of L.
Technical Details for Spline Approximation: The B-Spline Approach
(a) Tensor-product B-Spline Basis Functions.
Step 1: For each l= 1; : : : ; n, dene an extended partition Gel := fyl;ig2s+di=1 , where
yl;1 =   = yl;s = xl;0; yl;s+1 = xl;1; : : : ; yl;s+d = xl;d; yl;s+d+1 =   = yl;2s+d = xl;d+1:
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Step 2: For 1 i1; : : : ; in  s+ d; l= 1; : : : ; n, dene the tensor-product B-Spline basis function as
Ni1;:::;in(x1; : : : ; xn) =
Qn
l=1N
s
l;il
(xl), where
N sl;i(xl) =
8<: ( 1)
s(yl;i+s  yl;i)[yl;i; : : : ; yl;i+s](xl  y)s 1+ ; if xl;i  xl <xl;i+1
0; otherwise
for all xl 2 [pl; pl] for all l= 1; : : : ; n and for all i= 1; : : : ; d+ s, where (xl  y)+ =maxf0; xl  yg,
and [t1; : : : ; tr+1]f(y) :=
Pr+1
i=1 f(ti)
Qr+1
j=1;j 6=i(ti  tj) 1 is the rth order divided dierence of a single
variate real function f over the points t1; : : : ; tr+1.
(b) Calculating the Linear Coecients.
Step 1: For l= 1; : : : ; n; i= 1; : : : ; d+ s, let
l;i;j = yl;i+(yl;i+s  yl;i)j  1
s  1 and l;i;j =
jX
v=1

(v)
l;i  
(v 1)
l;i;j (0)
(v  1)! ; for j = 1; : : : ; s;
where

(v)
l;i =
( 1)v 1(v  1)!
(s  1)! 
(s v)
l;i;s (0) and
l;i;s(t) =
s 1Y
r=1
(t  yl;i+r);  l;i;j(t) =
j 1Y
r=1
(t  l;i;r);  l;i;1(t) 1:
Step 2: For any f = (f1; : : : ;fn)2 C0(P), let fl;i : C0([pl; pl])!Rg
n;s+d
l=1;i=1 be a set of linear
functionals dened as follows:
l;ifl =
sX
j=1
l;i;j[l;i;1; : : : ; l;i;j]fl:
Dene another set of linear functionals fi1;:::;ings+d;:::;s+di1=1;:::;in=1 such that
i1;:::;inf = 1;i1  2;i2     n;inf;
where l;il is understood as being applied to f as a function of xl. By the construction of l;il and
the denition of divided dierences, basic algebra yields:
i1;:::;inf =
sX
j1=1
j1X
r1=1
  
sX
jn=1
jnX
rn=1
Qn
l=1 l;il;jlQn
l=1
Qjl
sl=1;sl 6=rl(l;il;rl   l;il;sl)
f(1;i1;r1 ; : : : ; n;in;rn):
Step 3: Dene a linear operator Ll : C0([pl; pl])! Sl(Gl; s) as Llf(xl) =
Ps+d
i=1 (l;if)N
s
l;i(xl), for all
l= 1; : : : ; n. Similarly, dene a linear operator L : C0(P)! S(G; s) as
Lf(x1; : : : ; xn) =
s+dX
i1=1
  
s+dX
in=1
(i1;:::;inf)Ni1;:::;in(x1; : : : ; xn):
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Figure 4 Illustration of tensor-product B-Spline basis functions
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Note. In this example, the domain is [80;500] [80;500], and s= 3; d= 1. The knots grid G consists of (d+2)n = 32 = 9
points, i.e., (80;80), (80;290), (80;500), (290;80), (290;290), (290;500), (500;80), (500;290), (500;500), which slice
the domain into 4 pieces (rectangles). A spline in S(G;3) is a biquadratic function on each piece, and is continuously
dierentiable on the places where dierent pieces connect. Per our construction, there are (s+ d)n = 42 = 16 basis
functions. These hill-like basis functions are the building blocks for spline approximation.
Note that L=L1 L2      Ln, where this composition of linear operators is understood as Ll
being applied to a function of xl.
Step 4: Set g =Lf .
Lemma 5. L is a bounded linear operator mapping C0(P) to S(G; s). Also, Lf = f for all f 2

nl=1Ps 1([pl; pl]).
Spline approximation with noisy observations.We will now discuss the estimation of demand
function (:) by spline approximation with noisy observations. Let ~G := f(1;i1;j1 ; : : : ; n;in;jn) : 1
i1; : : : ; in  s+d;1 j1; : : : ; jn  sg. Note that the constants fi1;:::;injgs+d;:::;s+di1=1;:::;in=1 depends on j (:)
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only via j (p); p 2 ~G. So, if the seller could observe the demand rate of product j under prices
in ~G, he could construct an approximation of j (:) using a linear combination of tensor-product
B-splines. In our problem, the seller cannot observe j (p) for p2 ~G, but only its noisy observation
Dj(p) = 

j (p) +j. To address this, we use empirical mean as a surrogate of 

j (p) and propose
the following Spline Estimation algorithm to estimate the demand.
Spline Estimation
Input Parameters: ~L0; n; s; Tuning Parameter: d
Algorithm:
Step 1: Estimate (p) at points p2 ~G. Set L0 = ~L0s n(s+ d) n. For each p2 ~G
a. Apply price p L0 times
b. Let ~(p) be the sample mean of the L0 observations.
Step 2: Construct spline approximation.
a. Calculate coecients cji1;:::;in ;1 i1; : : : ; in  s+ d; j = 1; : : : ; n as:
cji1;:::;in =
sX
j1=1
j1X
r1=1
  
sX
jn=1
jnX
rn=1
~j(1;i1;r1 ; : : : ; n;in;rn)
Qn
l=1 l;il;jlQn
l=1
Qjl
sl=1;sl 6=rl(l;il;rl   l;il;sl)
:
b. Construct a tensor-product spline function ~(p) = (~1(p); : : : ; ~n(p)), where
~j(p) =
s+dX
i1=1
  
s+dX
in=1
cji1;:::;inNi1;:::;in(p):
Note that ~L0 =L0(s+d)
nsn is the duration of the Spline Estimation algorithm. Let a^ b denote
minfa; bg. The following important lemma states the errors of approximating (p) and r(p)
using ~(p) and r~(p) respectively. (Note that by choosing s 3, r~ is well-dened.)
Lemma 6. Set d= (~L
1=2
0 log
 1 k)1=(s+n). If ~L0  log3 k and s 3, then there exist positive constants
M4 and M5 independent of k 3 such that for all k 3,
P

jj(:)  ~(:)jj1 M4(~L 1=20 logk)
s^s
s+n

 2
k
and
P

jj(r(:) r~(:))0jj1 M5(~L 1=20 logk)
(s^s) 1
s+n

 2
k
:
Exploration algorithm. Using spline approximate ~(p), we formulate an approximate determin-
istic problem as follows:
(~P) ~rD := max
p2P

~r(p) : A~(p) C
T

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Figure 5 Illustration of locally linear approximation
Note. We propose to linearize the true nonparametric demand function (:) at pD and use this linear demand
function (:;) as a surrogate for the true demand function. By doing this, we \transform" the nonparametric case
into a parametric case with linear demand function family. Then, we linearize the estimated spline function ~(:) at p
to attain a linear demand function (:; ^), and view ^ as an estimate of the \true" .
where ~r(p) = p  ~(p). Let p denote an optimal solution of ~P. Although p does not equal pD =
argmaxp2Pfr(p) : s:t:A(p) C=Tg due to estimation error, p lies in close proximity of pD when
demand estimation error is small. The following lemma gives a Lipschitz-type \nonparametric"
perturbation result for the deterministic pricing problem.
Lemma 7. There exists a positive constant M6 independent of jj(:)   ~(:)jj1 and jj(r(:)  
r~(:))0jj1, such that jjpD  pjj1 M6maxfjj(:)  ~(:)jj1; jj(r(:) r~(:))0jj1g.
Since PSC is developed for the parametric demand case, to apply self-adjusting price update, we
need to nd an appropriate parametric demand family to approximate (:). Note that we cannot
use the spline function ~(:) because its inverse function may not exist. A natural candidate is to use
the linear function family (p;) = a+Bp where a2Rn;B 2Rnn. Let B01; : : : ;B0n be the columns in
B0, and dene = (a;B01; : : : ;B
0
n)2Rn(n+1). Under the linear function family, the most proper candi-
date for the \true parameter vector" is  = ((pD) r(pD) pD;r1(pD); : : : ;rn(pD)), which
corresponds to the linearization of (:) at pD (i.e., (:;)). Note that replacing (:) with (:; )
in the deterministic problem will not change the deterministic solution, i.e., pD = pD(), due to the
KKT optimality condition. Therefore, as one may conjecture, if we can estimate  well and use the
corresponding estimated linear demand function to approximate the true demand function, we may
be able to apply self-adjusting update and guarantee a strong revenue performance. However, we
cannot simply use (~(pD) r~(pD);r~1(pD); : : : ;r~n(pD)) as an estimate of . This is because,
even though ~(:) can approximate (:) well, we do not know pD. That said, Lemma 7 tells us that
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p lies in close proximity of pD. This suggests that we use ^= (~(p) r~(p)  p;r~1(p); : : : ;r~n(p))
to approximate . (See Figure 5 for an illustration.) We state a lemma.
Lemma 8. There exists a constant M7 independent of k and ~L0 such that if ~L0  log3 k and s 3,
then
P

jj  ^jj2 >M7(~L0)

 8
k
where (~L0) = (logk=
p
~L0)
((s^s) 1)=(s+n).
Nonparametric self-adjusting control. We now introduce a heuristic that combines the self-
adjusting price update with the aforementioned exploration algorithm. Since the duration of Spline
Estimation is ~L0 periods, the self-adjusting price updates will be applied starting from period
~L0 + 1. Let ~t := t + 
(pt)   (pt; ^). Let p0() denote the optimal solution to the following
optimization problem
(P0()) r0 := max
p2P

r(p;) : A(p;) C~L0
T   ~L0

where r(p;) = p  (p;), C~L0 is the capacity level at the end of period ~L0. Denote by 0() =
(p0();). The heuristic is outlined below.
Nonparametric Self-adjusting Control (NSC)
Input parameters: n; s, Tuning Parameters: d;L0
Stage 1 (Exploration Phase 1 - Spline Estimation)
Apply Spline Estimation ~L0 periods to get ~(:).
Stage 2 (Exploration Phase 2 - Demand Linearization)
a. Solve ~P and obtain the optimizer p.
b. Set ^= (~(p) r~(p)  p;r~1(p); : : : ;r~n(p)).
c. Let (p; ^) = a^  B^p, for all p2P, where (a^; B^01; : : : ; B^0n) = ^.
Stage 3 (Exploitation)
a. Solve P0(^) for its static price p0(^)
b. For t= ~L0+1 to T , do:
- If Ct 1  0, apply
pt = p
0(^) rp(0(^); ^) 
t 1X
s=~L0+1
Q ~s
T   s
- Otherwise, for product j = 1 to n, do:
- If product j requires any resource that has been depleted, set pt;j = p
1
j .
- Otherwise, set pt;j = pt 1;j.
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Table 2 Performance comparison of NSC and Misspecied PSC
Revenue NSC Misspecied
k upper bd. RL(Std.) % of RL RL(Std.) % of RL
100 24970 10034 (29) 40.2% 17774 (52) 71.2%
300 74911 27441 (56) 36.6% 53489 (93) 71.4%
1000 249702 41106 (483) 16.5% 178192 (175) 71.4%
3000 749107 78433 (553) 10.5% 535224 (298) 71.4%
10000 2497023 167193 (794) 6.7% 1785524 (560) 71.5%
30000 7491069 349278 (1668) 4.7% 5359727 (989) 71.5%
100000 24970230 744175 (4938) 3.0% 17865978 (1725) 71.5%
300000 74910689 1532658 (7808) 2.0% 53593646 (2973) 71.5%
The setting of this numerical example is the same as in the one in Table 1. NSC is the NSC
developed in this section with s= 3. Misspecied refers to the case where the seller uses PSC but
wrongly assumes that the demand model comes from the linear function family whereas in fact it is
a logit demand.
The following result states that when the tuning parameters are selected optimally, the perfor-
mance of NSC is close to the best achievable performance.
Theorem 3. (Near Rate-Optimality of NSC) Let ~L0 = k
(s+n)=(2s+n 1)(logk)2(s 1)=(2s+n 1).
In addition, we set d= (~L
 1=2
0 logk)
 1=(s+n) = (
p
k log 1 k)1=(2s+n 1). Then, there exists a constant
M3 independent of k > 3 such that for all s 3, we have
NSC(k)  M3k 12+(n;s;s) logk; where (n; s; s) = 12

2s 2(s^s)+n+1
2s+n 1

.
Note that unlike the heuristic proposed in Besbes and Zeevi (2012) which requires knowing s as
input, our heuristic does not require the knowledge of the smoothness index s. More interestingly,
since most commonly used demand functions such as polynomial demand with arbitrary degree,
logit demand, and exponential demand are innitely dierentiable (i.e., s can be arbitrarily large),
for any xed  > 0, we can select integers s (n+1)=(4)  (n  1)=2 such that the performance
under NSC is O(k1=2+ logk). Since  can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, the performance of
NSC is very close to the best achievable performance lower bound 
(
p
k).
Per our discussions in x2, one drawback of the parametric approach is that the assumed demand
function family may be misspecied; in particular, if the seller chooses the wrong functional form
of the demand function and then blindly applies the parametric approach, the revenue loss can be
huge. Given this drawback, our result provides an important insight: Since the asymptotic revenue
loss gap between PSC and NSC is not too large when the demand function behaves nicely (i.e.,
the demand function is suciently smooth), if the seller is not very condent about the functional
form of the demand function, he may be better o using the nonparametric approach. Indeed, our
numerical illustration in Table 2 and Figure 6 show that model misspecication can potentially
have a great impact on revenue.
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Figure 6 Comparing the parametric approach and the nonparametric approach
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Note. Using the data in Table 1-2, this log-log plot of revenue loss over scaling factor k compares the parametric and
the nonparametric approaches. Note that the slope of the line represents the order of the revenue loss. The slopes for
Misspecied, PSC and NSC are 1.0, 0.56 and 0.61 respectively in this graph.
5. Closing Remarks
We study the joint learning and pricing of the capacitated network RM problem. We develop
heuristics for both the parametric and the nonparametric cases and evaluate their asymptotic
performances. For the general parametric case, we develop the PSC heuristic, which rst learns
the demand function parameters by price experimentation and ML estimation, and then adjusts
the price over time according to the realized demand. The heuristic is computationally easy to
implement since it only requires one estimation and one optimization. Most strikingly, the heuristic
achieves the best achievable asymptotic performance as its revenue loss rate is exactly O(pk). This
is the rst known heuristic that attains the exact revenue loss lower bound for the capacitated
network RM problems with general parametric demand. We also study the case where the family of
the candidate demand functions satises the so-called \well-separatedness" condition. Under this
condition the parameter estimation becomes much easier, and the seller can do exploitation while
at the same time passively learn demand function. We develop the APSC heuristic, a modication
of PSC, that reduces the revenue loss to O(log2 k). APSC is also a practical heuristic as it requires
one optimization and (log2 k) re-estimations.
Finally, we study the nonparametric case where the seller lacks the information of the functional
form of demand. We develop a heuristic called NSC that uses Spline Estimation and demand lin-
earization during the exploration stage to construct a linear demand function that closely approx-
imates the nonparametric demand function around the optimal deterministic price. During the
exploitation stage, we apply self-adjusting price updates. Although it is well-known that nonpara-
metric learning in multidimensional problems suers from the so-called \curse of dimensionality",
we show that if the demand function is suciently smooth, then the performance under NSC is
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O(k1=2+ logk) for any xed  > 0. Since the family of most commonly used demand functions are
innitely dierentiable, this result highlights an important point that not knowing the functional
form of the demand function should not aect the revenue as much as one initially think.
In conclusion, two gaps in the literature have been signicantly closed. By developing PSC with
O(pk) revenue loss bound, we close the gap between the revenue loss lower bound 
(pk) and
the best revenue loss upper bound for existing heuristics under the general parametric case. By
developing NSC with O(k1=2+ logk) revenue loss bound with arbitrarily small  > 0, we close the
gap between the best performance bounds of the parametric case and the nonparametric case when
the underlying demand function is suciently smooth. Our results suggest the wide applicability
of self-adjusting controls in dynamic pricing problem. These simple self-adjusting controls can be
used as a baseline for companies to develop more sophisticated dynamic pricing policies.
Endnotes
1. For example, in the airline industry, the benet of using RM is roughly comparable to the
airline's annual total prot, which is about 4%-5% of total revenue (Talluri and van Ryzin 2005).
2. A typical major US airline operates more than a thousand ights daily, each of which has more
than ten dierent booking classes that are characterized by dierent combinations of service level
and purchase restriction. Since passengers book tickets in advance, the airline needs to price not
only the tickets for the same-day ights but also those with departure dates several months in the
future. All these factors put together can easily translate into a daily pricing decision for millions
of itineraries.
3. Although we implicitly assume that the demand function is stationary, our heuristics can be
extended to accommodate some time-varying demand scenarios if the time-dependence of demand
function has certain structural form. For example, in the fashion industry, irrespective of the
condition of the market, the seller usually knows the fractions of the total sales that will be
realized at multiple milestones over the selling season. This can be captured by incorporating in our
demand model additively a time factor which is a known time-dependent fraction of an unknown
total market size. Note that this model can be handled under the current stationary estimation
framework by treating the unknown total market size as an additional parameter.
4. Jasin (2014) uses Q=HA for some H satisfying AH = I.
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EC.1. Proof of Results in Section 3.1
In this section, we rst prove Theorem 1 in xEC.1.1 using Lemma 1-3 and then we prove these
lemmas in xxEC.1.2-EC.1.4 respectively. The proofs of other supporting lemmas which are used to
prove Lemma 3 are deferred to xEC.1.5.
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EC.1.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Throughout the proofs of this section, we x = PSC and assume without loss of generality that
T = 1. Let L= dpke. For k 3, the total expected revenue loss under PSC is:
(k)  Lr+M0
"
(L)2k+
logk
1 P(E(L)> ) +L+
1+ kP
 
E(L)> 

1 P(E(L)> )
#
where the inequality follows because the revenue function in each period is bounded between 0 and
r and also by Lemma 3. Since, by Lemma 2, kP(E(L)> ) k1 exp( 22d
p
ke)! 0 as k tends
to innity, there exists a constant K  3 such that for all k >K, we have kP(E(L)> )< 1
2
and
(1 P(E(L)> )) 1 < 2. So, for all k >K, we can bound
(k)  d
p
ker+M0 
2
3 k
dpke +2M0 logk+M0d
p
ke+3M0
 2
p
kr+M0 
2
3
p
k+2M0
p
k+2M0
p
k+3M0
p
k
 (2r+M023 +7M0)
p
k;
where 3 is as in Lemma 2. As for k < K, we have 
(k)  Kr. The result of Theorem 1 then
follows by letting M1 =maxfKr;2r+M023 +7M0g. This completes the proof. 
EC.1.2. Proof of Lemma 1
We will prove each part of the lemma in turn. Let  = minf1; 2g where 1 and 2 are strictly
positive constants to be dened shortly.
Proof of part (a). This is an immediate corollary of Lemma 7 in x4. Note that, by assump-
tion P2, we have jj(p;)   (p;)jj1  jj(p;)   (p;)jj2  !jj   jj2 and jj(r(p;)  
r(p;))0jj1 = max1in
Pn
j=1 j@i@pj (p;)  
@i
@pj
(p;)j  n!jj   jj2 for all  2 ; p 2 P. Hence,
jj(:;)  (:;)jj1 = supp2P jj(p;)  (p;)jj1  !jj   jj2 and jj(r(:;) r(:;))0jj1 =
supp2P jj(r(:;)  r(:;))0jj1  n!jj   jj2. Therefore, by Lemma 7, jjpD()   pD()jj1 
nM6!jj jj2. Let 1 = (2n3=2M6!) 1. For all  satisfying jj jj2   1, we have jjpD() 
pD()jj2  n1=2jjpD()   pD()jj1  n3=2M6!1  =2. Hence, pD() 2 Ball(pD(); =2). Since
Ball(pD(); )P by R4, we conclude that Ball(pD(); =2)P.
Since (:;) is continuously dierentiable with respect to p 2 P as implied by P3, and P is
compact, there exists a constant K > 0 independent of k > 0 such that
jjD() D()jj2 = jj(pD();) (pD();)jj2
 jj(pD();) (pD();)jj2+ jj(pD();) (pD();)jj2
 KjjpD()  pD()jj2+!jj  jj2
 (!+n3=2KM6!)jj  jj2;
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where the second inequality also follows by P2. The result follows by letting = !+ n3=2KM6!.
Part (a) is proved.
Proof of part (b). Since P() is a convex program for all  2, by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
optimality condition, rr(D();) = A0D(). By our assumption, A has full row rank. Thus,
there exists some m by n matrix A such that D() = Arr(D();). Since the right hand side is
continuous at , we conclude that D(:) is continuous at  as well. Part (b) is proved.
Proof of part (c). Let  = min1infDi () : Di () > 0g. Since D(:) is continuous at  by
part (b), there exists 2 > 0 such that jjD() D()jj2 < for all  2Ball(; 2). This means for
 2 Ball(; ), we also have Di ()> 0 whenever Di ()> 0, which implies that the corresponding
constraints in P() are binding due to Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition. Part (c) is proved. 
EC.1.3. Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of Lemma 2 is a multiproduct extension of Lemma 3.7 in Broder and Rusmevichientong
(2012), and is based on a well-known result in Maximum Likelihood Theory. We state this result
in Theorem EC.1 (see xEC.4.1).
To apply Theorem EC.1 to our setting, we simply need to verify conditions (i)-(iv). First, note
that  is a compact subset of Rq and D~q is a discrete-valued sample space. Conditions (i) and (iv),
they are immediately satised because of S1 and S3. As for conditions (ii) and (iii), recall that
r logP~p;(D1:~q)2 =


~qX
s=1
" 
1 
nX
j=1
Ds;j
!
r log
 
1 
nX
j=1
j(~p
(s);)
!
+
nX
j=1
Ds;jr logj(~p(s);)
#

2

~qX
s=1
0@
r log
 
1 
nX
j=1
j(~p
(s);)
!

2
+
nX
j=1
r logj(~p(s);)2
1A :
By Assumption P1 and S2, for all 1  s  ~q and 1  j  n, j(~p(s); :) 2 C1() and is bounded
away from zero, and
Pn
j=1 j(~p
(s); :) 2 C1() is also bounded away from one. These imply that
jjr log

1 Pnj=1 j(~p(s); :) jj2 and jjr logj(~p(s); :)jj2, j = 1; : : : ; n, are both continuous functions
of  for s= 1; : : : ; ~q and are, due to compactness of , bounded. So, (ii) follows. As for (iii), note
that P~p;(D1:~q) is continuous in  and it is also bounded away from zero. (In fact, P~p;(D1:~q) 
[nmin(1 max)]~q by S2.) So, !
p
P~p;(D1:~q) is dierentiable on  for all D1:~q 2D~q. We have thus
veried all the conditions of Theorem EC.1.
We will now use Theorem EC.1 to prove Lemma 2. A direct application of Theorem EC.1
leads to P(E(L) > )  1 exp( 2L2). Also, since (L)2 = E [E(L)2] =
R1
0
P(E(L)2  x)dx =R1
0
P(E(L)px)dx R1
0
1e
 2Lxdx= 1=(2L), the result follows by taking 3 =
p
1=2. 
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EC.1.4. Proof of Lemma 3
Fix  = PSC. Without loss of generality, we assume that T = 1. Let A denote the event that
E(L) . We rst dene a stopping time and show some useful properties of this stopping time
on the event of A. Let L > 0 be such that ALe  C. Dene  = minf;2Lgmaxf2;4!jjQjj2g and dene the
cumulative demand at the end of period t as St :=
Pt
s=1Ds. Let  be the minimum of k and the
rst time tL+1 the following condition is violated:
(C1)  >


tX
s=L+1
^s
k  s


2
+
SL LLek  t

2
:
Let Ct denote the available capacity level at the end of period t. We denote by ^t := 
D(^L) Pt 1
s=L+1
Q^s
k s the demand rate that the seller believes he induces in period t, and by t :=
(p(^t; ^L);
) the actual induced demand rate upon applying price p(^t; ^L) in period t. Note that,
by denition, we can also write ^t = (p(^t; ^L); ^L). We state two useful lemmas.
Lemma EC.1. For sample paths in A, we have Ct  0 and ^t 2^L for all L+1 t <  .
Lemma EC.2. There exists K0 > 0 independent of k 3 such that for all k 3
E[k   jA]  K0

logk
1 P(E(L)> ) + (L)
2k+L

:
Lemma EC.1 essentially says that, on A, the remaining capacity Ct is always positive and the
price p(^t; ^L) is always feasible before  , and Lemma EC.2 establishes a bound for the expected
remaining time after  . Dene rD() := r(D();) and let Rt denote the revenue earned during
period t under policy . Let t :=R

t   r(t;). We have:
kX
t=L+1
rD() E
h
R^(k)
i
= E
"
 1X
t=L+1
 
rD() Rt

+
kX
t=
 
rD() Rt
#
= E
"
 1X
t=L+1
 
rD()  r(t;)

+
kX
t=
 
rD() Rt
# E "  1X
t=L+1
t
#
 E
"
 1X
t=L+1
 
rD()  r(t;)

+
kX
t=
 
rD() Rt
A
#
P(A)+ rkP(Ac) E
"
 1X
t=L+1
t
#
 E
"
 1X
t=L+1
 
rD()  r(t;)

+
kX
t=
 
rD() Rt
A
#
+ rkP(Ac)+ r
= E
"
 1X
t=L+1
 
rD()  r(t;)

+
kX
t=
 
rD() Rt
A
#
+ r+ rkP(E(L)> ): (EC.1)
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The rst inequality follows because r is the upper bound on revenue rate for each period, which is
also the maximum possible revenue loss for a single period on average. As for the second inequality,
note that f tgk 1t=L+1 is a martingale dierence sequence with respect to fHtgk 1t=L+1. Thus, by the
Optional Stopping Time Theorem, we have  E
hP 1
t=L+1
t
i
=  E Pt=L+1 t+ E    r,
so the second inequality holds. We now analyze the rst two terms in (EC.1). By Taylor expansion
and R3,
E
"
 1X
t=L+1
 
rD()  r(t;)

+
kX
t=
 
rD() Rt
A
#
+ r
E
"
 1X
t=L+1
rr(D();)  (D() t)
A
#
+
v
2
E
"
 1X
t=L+1
jjD() tjj22
A
#
+r (E[k   jA] + 2) (EC.2)
By Lemma EC.1, ^t = 
D(^L) Q
Pt 1
s=L+1
^s
k s 2 ^L before  . Also, recall that, by denition,
^t =Dt  ^t =t+t  ^t. So, we can write the rst term in (EC.2) as follows:
E
"
 1X
t=L+1
rr(D();)  (D() t)
A
#
=E
"
 1X
t=L+1
D()
0
A

D()  ^t+ ^t t
A
#
=E
"
 1X
t=L+1
D()
0
 
AD() AD(^L)+
t 1X
s=L+1
A^s
k  s +At A^t
!A
#
=E
"
 1X
t=L+1
D()
0 
AD() AD(^L)
A
#
+E
"
 1X
t=L+1
D()
0
 
t 1X
s=L+1
A^s
k  s +At A^t
!A
#
: (EC.3)
By Lemma 1(c), for all sample paths on A, the set of constraints of P() that have nonzero
optimal dual variables also have nonzero optimal dual variables in P(^L) and are thus binding at
the optimal solution D(^L). This implies that the rst expectation in (EC.3) is zero because, for
all i, either we have Di (
) = 0 or (AD())i  (AD(^L))i = 0. As for the second term of (EC.3),
we can further write:
E
"
D()0
 1X
t=L+1
 
t 1X
s=L+1
A^s
k  s +At A^t
!A
#
= E
"
 1X
t=L+1
D()0At
A
#
+E
"
 1X
t=L+1

   t  1
k  t   1

D()0A^t
A
#
:
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Since ftgk 1t=L+1 is a martingale dierence sequence with respect to fHtgk 1t=L+1, we can bound:
E
"
 1X
t=L+1
D()0At
A
#
=
D()0A
P(A)
(
E
"
 1X
t=L+1
t
#
 E
"
 1X
t=L+1
t
Ac
#
P(Ac)
)
 D()0Ae 1+ kP
(E(L)> )
1 P(E(L)> ) ;
where the inequality follows because E[
P 1
t=L+1t] = E[
P
t=L+1t]  E[ ]  e (by Optional
Stopping Time Theorem) and the fact that jtj  e. As for the second term, note that, by (C1) in
the denition of  ,
E
"
 1X
t=L+1

   t  1
k  t   1

D()0A^t
 A
#
 E
"
(k   +1)
D()0
 1X
t=L+1
A^t
k  t

 A
#
 E
"
(k   +1) D()
2
jjAjj2


 1X
t=L+1
^t
k  t


2
 A
#
  D()
2
jjAjj2 (E [k   jA] + 1) :
Putting this together with Lemma EC.2, for the rst term in (EC.2), we have:
E
"
 1X
t=L+1
rr(D();)  (D() t)
 A
#
 K1

logk
1 P(E(L)> ) + (L)
2k + L +
1+ kP(E(L)> )
1 P(E(L)> )

;
where the constant K1 = 
D()0Ae+(1+K0) jjD()jj2jjAjj2 is independent of k 3.
We now bound the second term in (EC.2). Note that
v
2
E
"
 1X
t=L+1
jjD() tjj22
 A
#
 vE
"
 1X
t=L+1
^t t2
2
 A
#
+ vE
"
 1X
t=L+1
D()  ^t2
2
 A
#
: (EC.4)
Since t = (p(^t; ^L);
) and ^t = (p(^t; ^L); ^L), by P2, we have
vE[
 1X
t=L+1
jj^t tjj22jA]  v!2kE[jj  ^Ljj22 jA]  v!2kE[jj  ^Ljj22]  v!2(L)2k:
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(By denition of A, E[jj  ^Ljj22 jA]E[jj  ^Ljj22].) As for the second term in (EC.4),
vE
"
 1X
t=L+1
D()  ^t2
2
 A
#
= vE
24  1X
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2
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^s
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2
2
 A
35 (EC.5)
where the second inequality follows by Lemma 1(a). Using ^t =Dt   ^t = t + t   ^t, we can
bound the second term in (EC.5) as follows:
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24  1X
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k  s
#2
 2
P(A)E

"
k 1X
t=L+1
t 1X
s=L+1
jjsjj22
(k  s)2
#
+2
k 1X
t=L+1
 
t 1X
s=L+1
!(L)
k  s
!2
 16
1 P(E(L)> ) logk+6!
2(L)2k (EC.6)
where the second inequality holds by the law of total expectation and P2, the third inequality
follows by rst expanding the square of the sum and then applying Cauchy-Swartz inequality to the
cross-terms, the fourth inequality follows by the orthogonality of martingale dierences fsg and
E[E(L)2jA] (L)2, and the fth inequality holds by integral approximation. In particular, the
rst term after the fourth inequality can be bounded using jjsjj2 = jjDs sjj2  jjDsjj2+ jjsjj2  2
and
Pk 1
t=L+1
Pt 1
s=L+1
1
(k s)2 
Pk 1
t=L+1
1
k t  1+ logk 2 logk (recall that k 3) whereas the second
term can be bounded using the following integral comparison:
k 1X
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1
k  s
!2

k 1X
t=1
 
t 1X
s=1
1
k  s
!2

k 1X
t=1
Z t
1
1
k  sds
2

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log2

k
k  t

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 log2 k+
Z k 1
1
log2

k
k  t

dt  log2 k+2k  3k; (EC.7)
where the last inequality follows because log2 k < k for k 1.
Thus, for the second term in (EC.2), we have
v
2
E
"
k 1X
t=L+1
jjD() tjj22
 A
#
 K2

logk
1 P(E(L)> ) + (L)
2k

;
where K2 = v!
2+2v2+32vjjQjj22+12!2vjjQjj22. Combining all results together, we conclude that
kX
t=L+1
rD() E
h
R^(k)
i
 M0
"
logk
1 P(E(L)> ) + (L)
2k+L+
1+ kP
 
E(L)> 

1 P(E(L)> )
#
;
where M0 =K1 +K2 + rK0 + 3r. (Note that the last term in (EC.1) can be bounded by r(1 +
kP(E(L)> ))=(1 P(E(L)> )).) This completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
EC.1.5. Proof of Supporting Lemmas
Proof of Lemma EC.1. As in the proof of Lemma 3, we assume without loss of generality that
T = 1. First, note that ^t 2^L is equivalent to pt 2P. Consider sample paths on A. If  L+1,
then there is nothing to prove. Suppose that  > L + 1, we will use an induction argument to
establish the result. Since E(L)   on A, by Lemma 1(a), Ball(pD(^L); 2 )  P. For t = L + 1,
jjpL+1  pD(^L)jj2 = 0< 2 , so pL+1 2P and hence ^L+1 2^L . In addition, we also have:
CL+1 =CL ADL+1 = kC  ASL A

^L+1+^L+1

= kC  LC +LC  ASL A

D(^L)+ ^L+1

 (k L  1)C +LC  ASL A^L+1
 (k L  1)ALe+LALe ASL A^L+1
= (k L  1)A
 
Le  SL LLe
k L  1  
^L+1
k L  1
!
 (k L  1)A
 
Le 
SL LLek L  1

2
e 

 ^L+1k L  1


2
e
!
 (k L  1) (L  )Ae
 0
(recall that St =
Pt
s=1Ds) where the rst inequality follows because A
D(^L)  C, the second
inequality follows because ALe C by denition of L, the fourth (strict) inequality follows by
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(C1) and Ae 0, and the last inequality follows by the denition of  . This is our base case. Now,
suppose that Cs  0; ^s 2 ^L for all s = L+ 1;L+ 2; : : : ; t  1, and t  1 <  . If t   , we have
nished the induction. If, on the other hand, t <  ,
pt  pD(^L)
2
 !jjQjj2


t 1X
s=L+1
^s
k  s


2
< !jjQjj2  
4
where the rst inequality follows by pt = p(^t; ^L); p
D(^L) = p(
D(^L); ^L) and P1, the second
inequality follows by (C1) and the last inequality follows by the denition of  . So, by Lemma 1(a),
we still have pt 2P and hence ^t 2^L . As for the remaining capacity level Ct, by similar argument
as before, we have
Ct =CL 
tX
s=L+1
ADs = kC  ASL 
tX
s=L+1
A

^s+^s

= kC   tC + tC  ASL 
tX
s=L+1
A
 
D(^L) Q
s 1X
v=L+1
^v
k  v +^s
!
 (k  t)C +LC  ASL 
tX
s=L+1
 
A^s 
s 1X
v=L+1
A^v
k  v
!
 (k  t)ALe+LALe ASL 
tX
s=L+1
 
A^s 
s 1X
v=L+1
A^v
k  v
!
= (k  t)A
 
Le  SL LLe
k  t  
tX
s=L+1
^s
k  s
!
 (k  t)A
 
Le 
SL LLek  t

2
e 


tX
s=L+1
^s
k  s


2
e
!
 (k  t)A(L  )e
 0:
This completes the induction. 
Proof of Lemma EC.2. As in the proof of Lemma 3, we assume without loss of generality that
T = 1. Because  is non-negative, we can write E[k   jA] = k Pk 1t=0 P( > tjA) =Pk 1t=1 P( 
tjA). We now bound P(  tjA). By the union bound, we have
P(  tjA) = P
 
max
L+1st
(SL LLek  s

2
+


sX
v=L+1
^v
k  v


2
)
 
A
!
 P
 
max
L+1st


sX
v=L+1
^v
k  v


2
  
2
A
!
+P

max
L+1st
SL LLek  s

2
  
2
A :
(EC.8)
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We rst bound the rst term in (EC.8) below.
P
 
max
L+1st


sX
v=L+1
^v
k  v


2
  
2
A
!
 P
0@ max
L+1st


sX
v=L+1
v
k  v


2
2
  
2
16
A
1A+P max
L+1st
sX
v=L+1
jjv   ^vjj2
k  v 
 
4
A
!
 1
P(A) P

0@ max
L+1st


sX
v=L+1
v
k  v


2
2
  
2
16
1A+P
0@ tX
s=L+1
jjs  ^sjj2
k  s
!2
  
2
16
A
1A
 16
 2P(A) E

24

tX
s=L+1
s
k  s


2
2
35+ 16
 2
E
24 tX
s=L+1
jjs  ^sjj2
k  s
!2A
35
 16
 2P(A) E

"
tX
s=L+1
jjsjj22
(k  s)2
#
+
16
 2
0@ tX
s=L+1
q
E[jjs  ^sjj22jA]
k  s
1A2
 16
 2P(A)

4
(k  t)2 +
4
k  t

+
16
 2
"
2!2(L)2
(k  t)2 +2!
2(L)2

log

k
k  t
2#
;
where the rst inequality follows by the denition of ^v, the triangle inequality of the norms and
union bound, the second inequality follows by the law of total probability for the rst term and
the monotonicity of max-operator for the second term, the third inequality follows by the Doob's
sub-martingale inequality for the rst term and Markov's inequality for the second term, the fourth
inequality follows by the orthogonality of martingale dierences for the rst term and Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality for the second term, and the last inequality follows by E[E(L)2jA]  (L)2
and the same integral approximation bound as in (EC.6).
As for the second term in (EC.8), we can apply Markov's inequality and get:
P

max
1st
SL LLek  s

2
  
2
A  P
 
jjSL LLejj22
(k  t)2 
 2
4
A
!
 max
(
1;
4
 2
E
"
jjSL LLejj22
(k  t)2
A
#)
 max

1;
4n(1+L)
2L2
 2(k  t)2

;
where the last inequality follows because jjSL LLejj2  jjLe+LLejj2 =
p
n(1 + L)L. Putting
all the bounds together, we have for all k 3:
E[k   jA] 
k 1X
t=1

16
 2P(A)

4
(k  t)2 +
4
k  t

+
16
 2

2!2(L)2
(k  t)2 +2!
2(L)2 log2

k
k  t

+
k 1X
t=1
max

1;
4n(1+L)
2L2
 2(k  t)2

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 128
 2P(A)
k 1X
t=1
1
k  t +
32!2(L)2
 2
k 1X
t=1
1
(k  t)2 +
32!2(L)2
 2
k 1X
t=1

log

k
k  t
2
+
k L 1X
t=1
4n(1+L)
2L2
 2(k  t)2 +L
 128
 2P(A)(1+ logk)+
64!2
 2
(L)2+
96!2
 2
(L)2k+

4n(1+L)
2
 2
+1

L
 256
 2
logk
1 P(E(L)> ) +
160!2
 2
(L)2k+

4n(1+L)
2
 2
+1

L
where the third inequality follows by integral approximation. The result follows by letting K0 =
256
 2
+ 160!
2
 2
+ 4n(1+L)
2
 2
+1. 
EC.2. Proof of Results in Section 3.2
In this section, we rst prove Lemma 4 in xEC.2.1, followed by the proof of Theorem 2 in xEC.2.2.
All the supporting lemmas which are used to prove Lemma 4 and Theorem 2 are proved in xEC.2.3.
EC.2.1. Proof of Lemma 4
We rst illustrate the idea using Figure EC.1. Note that E(t)>  is equivalent to the event that
ML estimator ^t is in the outside of the ball V := Ball(
; ). In addition, under the concavity
assumption of the log-likelihood, ^t 6= Ball(; ) implies that at least one point on the surface of
a hypercube S, which is centered at  and is a subset of V , has a larger log-likelihood than the
log-likelihood at . The probability of this event is a valid upper bound of P(E(t)> ). However,
the challenge is that there are a continuum of such potential points. The idea of the proof is to
consider a grid of points on the surface of that hypercube S, and the granularity of the grid is set
to be ne enough so that any point on the surface of that hypercube can be closely approximated
by one point on the grid. We will show that the existence of a point on the surface of S with a
higher log-likelihood than the true parameter vector  is extremely unlikely. We now rigorously
prove this lemma.
Step 1
Fix some 0 < ~min < ~max < 1. First, we will show that for all D 2 D, for all p 2 W(~min; ~max)
and for all  2 , r logPp;1 (D) is jointly continuous in  and p. Recall that r logPp;1 (D) =
((@=@1) logPp;1 (D); : : : ; (@=@n) logP
p;
1 (D)) where for all 1 k n,
@ logPp;1 (D)
@k
= 
(1 Pnj=1Dj) log1 Pnj=1 j(p;)
1 Pnj=1 j(p;)
 
nX
j=1
@j(p;)
@k
!
+
nX
j=1
Dj log (j(p;))
j(p;)
@j(p;)
@k
:
Since j(p; :) 2 C1() by P1, (:;) 2 C2(P) by P3 and the denominators are strictly greater than
zero, r logPp;1 (D) is jointly continuous in  and p.
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Figure EC.1 Geometric illustration of Lemma 4
Note. This illustrates the case when there are two parameters to estimate (q= 2). V denotes the disk (ball) centered
at  with radius . Note that the event of jj  ^tjj2 >  corresponds to the event when ^t lies in the exterior of V .
In this example, the surface of the rectangle(hypercube) S consists of four edges.
Step 2
Since  and W(~min; ~max) are compact, D is nite and r logPp;1 (D) is jointly continuous in
 and p for all D 2 D, there exists a constant cg > 0 independent of ; p;D such that for all
 2, p2W(~min; ~max), and v 2Rq satisfying jjvjj2 = 1, r logPp;1 (D)  v < cg. Therefore, for any
v; jjvjj2 = 1, if ps 2W(~min; ~max) for 1 s t, then we have:
r logP;t (D1:t)  v=
tX
s=1
r logPp

s ;
1 (Ds)  v < cgt: (EC.9)
Now, x  > 0 and consider a hypercube S 2 Rq centered at the origin with edge 2=pq. Let
@S denote the surface of S, its area is given by cq(=
p
q)q 1 for a constant cq that depends only
on q. Cover @S with a set of identical hypercubes in Rq 1 with edge 2 (see Figure EC.1 for an
illustration) and denote by N the number of cubes needed to cover @S. Then, N = (=(
p
q))q 1.
Let vj 2 @S; j = 1; : : : ;N denote the center of those 2 cubes. These points constitute a set of grid
points on the surface. Then for any x2 @S, minj=1;:::;N jjx  vjjj2 pq. By W3, we have that for
any 0 2 S+  and any j = 1; : : : ;N ,
logP;
0
t (D1:t)  logP;
+vj
t (D1:t)r logP;
+vj
t (D1:t)  (0    vj)
Let j() = argminj=1;:::;N jj    vjjj2. We then have
logP;
0
t (D1:t)  logP
;+vj(0)
t (D1:t) cgtjj0    vj(0)jj2  cg
p
qt: (EC.10)
where the rst inequality follows by (EC.9). The following is the key argument for this proof:n
jj^t  jj2 > 
o


jj^t  jj1 > p
q

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
n
logP;
+v
t (D1:t) logP;

t (D1:t); for some v with jjvjj1 = pq
o

n
logP
;+vj(+v)
t (D1:t)+ cg
p
qt logP;t (D1:t); for some v with jjvjj1 = pq
o
 [Nj=1
n
logP;
+vj
t (D1:t)+ cg
p
qt logP;t (D1:t)
o
= [Nj=1 fZt (vj;D1:t) exp( cg
p
qt)g ;
where Zt (u;D1:t) := P
;+u
t (D1:t)=P
;
t (D1:t) is the likelihood ratio for any u 2  . The rst
inclusion follows by norm inequality, the second inclusion follows by the concavity of the log-
likelihood function and the denition of ML estimator, the third inclusion follows by (EC.10), the
fourth inequality follows because by denition j(+ v) 2 f1; : : : ;Ng for all v. We state a lemma
below.
Lemma EC.3. Fix some 0< ~min < ~max < 1. Suppose that an admissible control  satises ps =
s(D1:s 1)2W(~min; ~max) for all 1 s t. Then there exists a constant ch > 0 such that for all 
and for all u2  , E[pZt (u;D1:t)] exp( chjjujj22t=2).
By Lemma EC.3, the following holds
P

jj^t  jj2 > 


NX
j=1
P (Zt (vj;D1:t) exp( cg
p
qt))

NX
j=1
exp

cg
p
qt
2

E
q
Zt (vj;D1:t)


NX
j=1
exp

cg
p
qt
2
  chjjvjjj
2
2t
2



p
q
q 1
exp

 ch
2t
2q
+
cg
p
qt
2

;
where the second inequality follows by the Markov's inequality, the third inequality follows by
Lemma EC.3, and the last inequality follows because N = (=(
p
q))q 1 and minj=1;:::;N jjvjjj2 
minj=1;:::;N jjvjjj1  =pq. Now, let = =t, then we have
P

jj^t  jj2 > 

min

1; q 
q 1
2 tq 1 exp

 ch
2t
2q
+
cg
p
q
2

:
Note that when   1; exp(( ch2q 1t + cgpq)=2)  exp(cgpq=2) exp( ch2q 1t=4). Note also
that when  > 1, there exists M > 0 independent of  such that exp(( ch2q 1t + cgpq)=2) 
exp( ch2q 1t=4);8t >M . With these two observations, we consider two cases below.
Case 1: t >M . In this case, we have P

jj^t  jj2 > 

 ~4tq 1 exp( 5t2), where ~4 =
q (q 1)=2maxf1; exp(cgpq=2), and 5 = chq 1=4.
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Case 2: tM . Let  be the largest distance between any two points in . ( <1 because  is
bounded.) Then, we claim that for this case, P

jj^t  jj2 > 

 4tq 1 exp( 5t2) where 5 is
dened as in Case 1 and 4 = exp(5M 
2). The claim is true because: if  > , P

jj^t  jj2 > 

=
0, so the bound holds; if  , P

jj^t  jj2 > 

 1 = 4 exp( 5M 2) 4tq 1 exp( 5t2).
Combining the two cases above, we conclude that P

jj^t  jj2 > 


minf1; 4tq 1 exp( 5t2)g where 4 =maxf~4; 4g. Hence,
E
h
jj^t  jj22
i
=
Z 1
0
P

jj^t  jj22  x

dx
=
Z 1
0
min

1; 4t
q 1 exp ( 5tx)
	
dx

Z 2(q 1) log t
5t
0
dx+
Z 1
2(q 1) log t
5t

4t
q 1 exp

 5tx
2

exp

 5tx
2

dx
 2(q  1) log t
5t
+ 4
Z 1
2(q 1) log t
5t
exp

 5tx
2

dx
 2(q  1) log t
5t
+
24
5t
 2maxf1; 4g
5
(q  1) log t+1
t
where the fourth inequality holds because for all x 2(q 1) log t
5t
, 4t
q 1 exp
  5tx
2
 1. We complete
the proof by letting 6 =
p
2maxf1; 4g=5. 
EC.2.2. Proof of Theorem 2
We rst state an analog of Lemma 1(a) for ECP() below.
Lemma EC.4. Suppose that B coincides with the set of binding constraints of P () at the optimal
solution. There exist ~ > 0 and ~> 0 independent of k > 0 such that for all  2Ball(; ~), jjxD() 
xD()jj2  ~jj  jj2.
The proof of Lemma EC.4 is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 and so is omitted. We now proceed
to prove Theorem 2 in several steps.
Step 1
Fix  = APSC and let k  3 throughout the proof. Throughout this section, we will assume that
T = 1. (This is without loss of generality.) Set L= d(logk)1+e and  = (logk) =4. We rst show
that the set of binding constraints of P() at the optimal solution can be correctly identied with
a very high probability. Let Ei := fCi = (AD())i; i =2 Bg [ fCi > (AD())i; i 2 Bg denote the
event that the ith capacity constraint is wrongly classied. (The event Ei is a union of two events:
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either the ith constraint is actually binding but not included in B or it is not binding but is included
in B.) By denition of ,
P
 
Ci = (A
D())i; i =2B

= P

Ci = (A
D())i; Ci  (AD(^t1))i > 

= P

(AD() AD(^t1))i > 

 P (jjAjj2E(t1)> )
 1 exp

 2t1 
2
2jjAjj22

 1 exp

  2
2jjAjj22
(logk)1+

2

;
where the rst inequality follows by Lemma 1(a), the second inequality follows by Lemma 2, and the
last inequality holds by denition of t1 and . Dene s :=minfCi  (AD())i :Ci  (AD())i >
0; i= 1; : : : ;mg. Since s does not scale with k, there exists a constant 
0 > 0 such that  < s=2 for
all k
0. So, for k
0, by Lemmas 1(a) and 2, we can bound:
P
 
Ci > (A
D())i; i2B

= P

Ci  (AD())i+ s; Ci  (AD(^t1))i  

 P

(AD(^t1) AD())i  s  

 P (jjAjj2E(t1) s  )
 1 exp

 2t1 (s  )
2
2jjAjj22

 1 exp

  2 s
2
42jjAjj22
log1+ k

:
Putting the above two bounds together, for k  
0, the probability of wrongly identifying the
binding constraints can be bounded as follows:
P ([mi=1Ei) 
mX
i=1

P
 
Ci = (A
D())i; i =2B

+P
 
Ci > (A
D())i; i2B

 m1

exp

  2
2jjAjj22
(logk)1+

2

+exp

  2 s
2
42jjAjj22
(logk)1+

: (EC.11)
Step 2
Let  be the minimum of k and the rst time t  t1 + 1 such that the following condition
(C1) is violated:  > jjPts=t1+1 ^sk s jj2 + jjSL LLek t jj2, where  is as dened in the proof of
Theorem 1 and ^s = Ds   (ps; ^tz) for s 2 (tz; tz+1] and 1  z  Z. Dene A := f\mi=1Eci g \n
E(tz)minf^; (log tz) =4g; for all tz < 
o
, where ^ = minf; ~;=(2!)g and  and ~ are as
dened in Lemma 1 and Lemma EC.4 respectively. (Event A can be interpreted as the event where
all binding constraints are correctly identied and the size of all subsequent estimation errors are
suciently small.)
Note that for tz <  , 
D() 2 ^tz on A. This is because jjp(D(); ^tz)  p(D(^tz); ^tz)jj2 
!jjD()  D(^tz)jj2  !jj  ^tz jj2  =2, where the rst inequality follows by P1, the second
ec16 e-companion to Chen, Jasin, Duenyas: Learning
inequality follows by Lemma 1(a) and the fact that ^  , and the last inequality follows since
^  =(2!). We then have D() 2 ^tz since p(D(); ^tz) 2 Ball(pD(^tz); =2) P, where the
last inclusion follows by Lemma 1(a). The two important lemmas below establish the approximation
error of DPUP and some important properties of the stopping time  .
Lemma EC.5. There exist positive constants  and  independent of  2 such that if jjxD() 
xNTz 1jj2  , then jjxD() xNTz jj2  jjxD() xNTz 1jj22.
Lemma EC.6. There exist positive constants 0 < ~min < ~max < 1, 
1, and constants  1 and  2
independent of k
1, such that ~min  min; ~max  max, and for all k
1 and all sample paths
on A:
(a) jjxD(^tz) xNTz jj22   1(log tz) =2 for tz <  .
(b) Ct  0, pt 2Ball(pD();7=8)W(~min; ~max) and ^t 2^tz for all t2 (tz; tz+1]\ [t1; ).
(c) E[jjxD(^tz) xNTz jj22 1ftz<g j A]  2=tz
Lemma EC.5 essentially establishes a uniform locally quadratic convergence of the Newton's
method for solving ECP(^tz) for all z, which is used for proving Lemma EC.6(a) and (c).
Lemma EC.6(a) and (c) establish the approximation errors between xNTZ and the deterministic opti-
mal solution xD(^tz). Note that Lemma EC.6(b) states that pt 2Ball(pD();7=8)W(~min; ~max)
for all t1  t <  . In addition, for t  t1, pt 2 f~p(1); : : : ; ~p(~q)g  W(~min; ~max) due to ~min  min,
~max  max and S2. Therefore, the condition for Lemma 4 is satised. There exists a constant

2 maxf
0;
1g such that, for all k
2,
kP(Ac)  k
ZX
z=1
h
P(E(tz)> ^)+P(E(tz)> (log tz) 

4
i
+ kP ([mi=1Ei)
 k
ZX
z=1
4t
q 1
z

exp

 5tz ^2

+exp

  5tz
(log tz)

2

+ kP ([mi=1Ei)
 2k(log2 k)
"
exp
 
 5(logk)
1+^2
2
!
+exp

 5(logk)
1+
2(logk)

2
#
+ kP ([mi=1Ei)
 2k(log2 k)
"
exp
 
 5(logk)
1+^2
2
!
+exp

 5(logk)
1+ 2
2
#
+ m1k

exp

  2
2jjAjj22
(logk)1+

2

+exp

  2 s
2
42jjAjj22
(logk)1+

 1
2
;
where the second inequality follows by Lemma 4, the third inequality follows by a combination of
4t
q 1
z exp( 5tz ^2=2)! 0 and 4tq 1z exp( 5tz(log tz) =2=2)! 0 as k!1, tz  t1  (logk)1+ for
z  1, and Z  dlog2 ke  2 log2 k, the fourth inequality follows by (EC.11), and the last inequality
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follows because the formula after the fourth inequality goes to zero as k!1. Note that the above
inequality also implies P(A) > 1
2
when k  
2. Dene 	 :=
Pk 1
t=t1+1
Pt 1
s=t1+1
(s)
k s
2
and  :=Pk 1
t=t1+1
(s)2, where (s) := 6
p
[(q  1) log tz +1]=tz for all s 2 (tz; tz+1]. By Lemma 4, E[jj^t  
jj221ft<gjA] (t)2. The following result is useful to derive our bounds later.
Lemma EC.7. Under APSC, there exists a constant K3 > 0 independent of k  1 such that 	 <
K3(1+ (q  1) logk) and  <K3[1+ logk+(q  1)(logk)2].
Step 3
Let K = maxf
0;
1;
2;3g. If k < K, the total expected revenue loss can be bounded by Kr.
So, we will focus on the case k K. By the same arguments as in (EC.1) and (EC.2), (k) 
Lr+
Pk
t=t1+1
rD() E [R^(k)] and
kX
t=t1+1
rD() E
h
R^(k)
i
 E
"
 1X
t=t1+1
D()0A(D() t)
A
#
+
v
2
E
"
 1X
t=t1+1
jjD() tjj22
#
+ rE[k   jA] + 2 r + r kP(Ac) (EC.12)
Note that on A we have D()0AD() = D()0ANTz (because BD() = CB =BNTz and
D()i = 0 for all i 62 B by KKT conditions). Therefore, similar to the proof of Lemma 3, we can
bound the rst term in (EC.12) with K4E[k  +1jA] where K4 := 3D()0Ae+ jjD()jj2jjAjj2
is independent of kK.
As for the second term in (EC.12), recall that ^t = 
NT
z(t)  Q
Pt 1
s=t1+1
^s
k s denotes the demand
rate that the seller believes he is inducing during period t where z(t) is the unique integer z such
that t 2 (tz; tz+1]. Note that (EC.4) still holds. We can bound two term in (EC.4) respectively
using: vE
hP 1
t=t1+1
jj^t tjj22
Ai = vPk 1t=t1+1E h!2jj^t  jj22 1ft<gAi  v!2Pk 1t=t1+1 (t)2 
v!2 (by P2), and
vE
"
 1X
t=t1+1
jjD()  ^tjj22
A
#
 2vE
"
 1X
t=t1+1
jjD() NTz(t)jj22
A
#
+2vE
24  1X
t=t1+1

Q
t 1X
s=t1+1
^s
k  s


2
2
A
35
 2vE
"
 1X
t=t1+1
jjD() NTz(t)jj22
A
#
+2vjjQjj22
0@E
24  1X
t=t1+1


t 1X
s=t1+1
s
k  s


2
2
A
35+E
24 k 1X
t=t1+1
 
t 1X
s=t1+1
!E(s)1fs<g
k  s
!2A
351A
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 2vE
"
 1X
t=t1+1
jjD() NTz(t)jj22
A
#
+2vjjQjj22
0B@ 16P(A) logk+
k 1X
t=t1+1
24 t 1X
s=t1+1
q
E

!2E(s)21fs<g
A
k  s
352
1CA
 2vE
"
 1X
t=t1+1
jjD() NTz(t)jj22
A
#
+2vjjQjj22(32 logk+!2	)
 K5(	+ logk)+ 2vE
"
 1X
t=t1+1
jjD() NTz(t)jj22
A
#
for some constant K5 > 0 independent of kK (the second and the third inequalities follow by the
same argument as in (EC.5) and (EC.6) and recall that K  3), and the fourth inequality follows
since E

E(s)21fs<g
A (s)2. We now analyze the last term of the above. Note that, on A, we
have for all t < D() NTz(t)2  D() xNTz(t)2+ NTz(t) xNTz(t)2
 2 D() xNTz(t)2
= 2
xD() xNTz(t)2
 2
xD() xD(^tz(t))
2
+2
xD(^tz(t)) xNTz 
2
; (EC.13)
where the second inequality follows because D() lies in Sz(t) where xNTz(t) is projected into (note
that on A, (1) ^tz(t) 2Ball(; =(2!)) for t <  which implies that, as shown previously, D()2
^tz(t)
, and (2) the binding constraints of P() at D() are correctly identied which means
that BD() = CB and ND()  CN) and the equality follows because D() = xD() on A
due to the strongly concavity of the objective and the fact that D() is an interior solution. By
Lemma EC.4
E
"
 1X
s=t1+1
jjxD() xD(^tz(s))jj22
A
#
=
k 1X
s=t1+1
E
h
~2jj  ^tz(s) jj221fs<g
Ai  ~2
Furthermore, by Lemma EC.6(a) and the fact that tz+1  tz  2tz for all z, we have
E
"
 1X
s=t1+1
jjxD(^tz(s)) xNTz(s)jj22
A
#
=
k 1X
s=t1+1
E
h
jjxD(^tz(s)) xNTz(s)jj221fs<g
Ai

ZX
z=1
(tz+1  tz) 2
tz
 2Z  2  4 2 log2 k:
Combining the inequalities above, the second term of (EC.12) can be bounded as follows:
v
2
E
"
 1X
t=t1+1
jjD() tjj22
#
 v!2+K5(	+ logk)+ 4v~2+16v 2 log2
 K6(1+ logk+(q  1) log2 k)
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for K6 = (v!
2 + 4v~2 +K5)K3 +K5 + 16v 2. To bound the third term in (EC.12), the following
lemma is useful.
Lemma EC.8. There exists a constant K7 > 0 independent of k  K such that for all k  K,
E[k   jA]K7(logk+L).
Combining all the above and recalling that L= d(logk)1+e, for all kK, we have:
(k)  2r(logk)1++(K4+ r)(E[k   jA] + 1)+K6(1+ logk+(q  1) log2 k)+ 5
2
r


2r+K4+ r+K6+
5
2
r

1+ (logk)1++(q  1) log2 k
 K8[(logk)1++(q  1) log2 k];
for some constant K8 independent of k  K. The result of Theorem 2 follows by using M2 =
maxfrK;K8g. 
EC.2.3. Proof of Supporting Lemmas
Proof of Lemma EC.3. Recall that D= fD 2 f0;1gn :Pnj=1Dj  1g. We dene the conditional
Hellinger distance as follows:
Ht (1; 2;DtjD1:t 1) :=
X
Dt2D
q
P;1t (DtjD1:t 1) 
q
P;2t (DtjD1:t 1)
2
:
We state a lemma and postpone its proof to the end of this subsection.
Lemma EC.9. Fix some 0< ~min < ~max < 1. Suppose that an admissible control  satises ps =
s(D1:s 1) 2 W(~min; ~max) for all 1  s  t. Then there exists a positive constant ch such that
Ht (1; 2;DtjD1:t 1) chjj1  2jj22 for all 1; 2 2.
For u 2    , dene Zt (u;DtjD1:t 1) := P;
+u
t (DtjD1:t 1)=P;

t (DtjD1:t 1). Using
Lemma EC.9, we can derive a bound for its moment below:
E
hp
Zt (u;DtjD1:t 1)
i
=
X
Dt2D
s
P;+ut (DtjD1:t 1)
P;t (DtjD1:t 1)
P;

t (DtjD1:t 1)
=
X
Dt2D
q
P;+ut (DtjD1:t 1)P;t (DtjD1:t 1)
= 1  H

t (
; +u;DtjD1:t 1)
2
 exp

 H

t (
; +u;DtjD1:t 1)
2

 exp

 chjjujj
2
2
2

:
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The result of Lemma EC.3 can now be proved by repeated conditioning: by denition,
E
hp
Zt (u;D1:t)
i
= E
h
E
hp
Zt (u;D1:t)
D1:t 1ii
= E
q
Zt 1(u;D1:t 1) E
hp
Zk (u;DtjD1:t 1)
i
 E
q
Zt 1(u;D1:t 1)

exp

 chjjujj
2
2
2

 exp

 chjjujj
2
2t
2

:
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma EC.5. Fix  2 . Note that ECP() is a convex optimization with linear
equality constraints. Let mB denote the number of columns of B, and dene F to be an n by
n mB matrix whose columns are linearly independent and BF = 0. (In case there are multiple
matrices that satisfy this condition, pick any one of them.) Then fx : Bx = CB=Tg = fx : x =
Fz+ x^; z 2Rn mBg where x^ satises Bx^=CB=T . Hence, ECP() is equivalent to an unconstrained
optimization problem maxz2Rn mB g(z;) := r(Fz + x^;) in the sense that there is a one-to-one
mapping between the optimizer of ECP() xD() and the optimizer of the unconstrained problem
zD(): (1) xD() = FzD() + x^, and (2) zD() = (F 0F ) 1F 0(xD()   x^). In addition, by Section
10.2.3 in Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004), if a feasible point of ECP() x(k) and a feasible point
of the unconstrained problem z(k) satisfy x(k) = Fz(k)+ x^, then the Newton steps for ECP() (to
obtain a new feasible point x(k+1)) and the unconstrained problem (to obtain a new feasible point
z(k+1)) coincide in the sense that x(k+1) = Fz(k+1)+ x^. This relationship enables us to analyze the
behavior of x(k) by studying z(k) whose convergence behavior is characterized by Theorem EC.2
(see xEC.4.2).
Before applying Theorem EC.2, we rst show that the conditions in Theorem EC.2 hold. Note
that since  is compact, the linear transformation of it, Z := fz : z = (F 0F ) 1F 0(x  x^); x 2 g
is also compact. Also note that since p(:;) 2 C2() by P3, r(:;) 2 C2() and g(:;) 2 C2(Z).
Hence condition (i) holds: there exists some constant L such that jjr2zzg(z;)   r2zzg(y;)jj2 
Ljjz  yjj2. Denote by min(:); max(:) the smallest and the largest eigenvalues of a squared matrix.
Since r2zzg(z;) = F 0r2r(Fz + x^;)F and  MI  r2r(Fz + x^;)   mI by P3, we conclude
that (ii) holds:   MI r2zzg(z;)  mI where M =Mmax(F 0F ) and m=mmin(F 0F ). Then, by
Theorem EC.2, we have that there exists a constant =minf1;3(1 2)g m2=L for some 2 (0;0:5)
independent of  such that if jjrzg(z(k);)jj2 < , then jjrzg(z(k+1);)jj2 < L2 m jjrzg(z(k);)jj22. Note
that by strong convexity of g(:;), M 1jjrzg(z;)jj2  jjz zD()jj2  2 m 1jjrzg(z;)jj2. Also note
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that for x = Fz + x^, jjx   xD()jj2  jjF jj2jjz   zD()jj2 and jjz   zD()jj2  jj(F 0F ) 1F 0jj2jjx  
xD()jj2. Therefore,
jjx(k+1) xD()jj2  jjF jj2jjz(k+1)  zD()jj2  2 m 1jjF jj2jjrzg(z(k+1);)jj2
 L m 2jjF jj2jjrzg(z(k);)jj22 L m 2 M jjF jj2jjz(k)  zD()jj22
 L m 2 M jjF jj2jj(F 0F ) 1F 0jj22jjx(k) xD()jj22
Let  =  and  = L m 2 M jjF jj2jj(F 0F ) 1F 0jj22. Note that they are both independent of . The
result follows by letting x(k+1) = xNTz and x
(k) = xNTz 1. 
Proof of Lemma EC.6. Let 
1 =maxi=1;::;4fVig, where Vi's are positive constants to be dened
later. We prove the results one by one.
(a) Let  = maxf; ~g where  and ~ are dened in Lemma 1 and Lemma EC.1 (see xEC.2.2)
respectively. Let  1 =maxf1;42g. We proceed by induction. If t1   , there is nothing to prove,
so we consider the case when t1 <  . Note that by DPUP algorithm, x
NT
1 = 
D(^t1) and x
D() =
D() on A. Thus, when t1 <  we have
jjxD(^t1) xNT1 jj22 = jjxD(^t1) D(^t1)jj22


jjxD(^t1) xD()jj2+ jjD() D(^t1)jj2
2
 42E(t1)2   1(log t1)  2
where the last inequality follows by the denition of A. This is our base case. We now do the
inductive step. Suppose that tz 1 <  and jjxD(^tz 1)  xNTz 1jj22   1(log tz 1) =2. If tz   there is
nothing to prove. If tz <  , then we need to show that jjxD(^tz) xNTz jj22   1(log tz) =2 also holds.
Let V1 > 0 be the smallest integer satisfying d(logV1)1+e> e2. Then, for k
1  V1, we havexD(^tz) xNTz 12
2
 3
xD(^tz) xD()2
2
+3
xD() xD(^tz 1)2
2
+3
xD(^tz 1) xNTz 12
2
 3
2
(log tz)

2
+
32
(log tz 1)

2
+
3 1
(log tz 1)

2
 3
2
(log tz)

2
+
32
(log
p
tz)

2
+
3 1
(log
p
tz)

2
 3 2+2 2 (2+ 1) 1
(log tz)

2
;
where the second inequality follows by denition of A and induction hypothesis, the third inequality
follows because tz 1  tz2 
p
tz 
p
t1 =
pd(logk)1+e> e when k 
1  V1. Let V2  V1 be such
that for all k  V2 and z = 1; : : : ;Z, the following holds: (1) (log tz)=2  3 2

2+2=2(2+ 1)

and (2) 92

2+2=2(2+ 1)
2
(log tz)
 =2  1  1. (Recall that  and  are the constants for the
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locally quadratic convergence of Newton's method dened in Lemma EC.5.) Inequality (1) ensures
that jjxD(^tz) xNTz 1jj2   for all k
1  V2 and inequality (2) ensures, by the locally quadratic
convergence of the Newton's method, that jjxD(^tz) xNTz jj22  2jjxD(^tz) xNTz 1jj42   1(log tz) =2.
This completes the induction.
(b) First, we claim that there exist 0< ~min < ~max < 1 such that (1) ~min  min and ~max  max,
and (2) if pt 2 Ball(pD();7=8) for t 2 [t1+1; ), then pt 2W(~min; ~max) for all 1 t <  , which
will be used to prove Lemma EC.6(c). If this is true, then Lemma 4 can be used to bound E(tz)
as long as tz <  . We now nd such ~min; ~max below.
We rst consider p 2 Ball(pD();7=8). Dene Vp := Ball(pD();7=8) (note that by our nota-
tion, Vp is a closed ball) and V() := fx 2  : x 2 (p;); p 2 Vpg. Also, dene Op := fp 2 P :
jjp   pD()jj2 < g (note that this is an open ball) and O() := fx 2  : x 2 (p;); p 2 Opg.
Note that Vp  Op  P by R4. This implies that V()  O()  . In addition, since p(:;)
is continuous in  by P3 and Op is an open set, O() is an open set. Therefore, O() lies in
the interior of , and hence, V()  O() also lies in the interior of . This implies that
for any  2 , min() := infp2Vpmin1jn j(p;) > 0 and max() := supp2Vp
Pn
j=1 j(p;) < 1.
Since  is compact and min() and max() are continuous functions, there exists some 
0; 00 2
 such that sup2 max() = max(
0) < 1 and inf2 min() = min(00) > 0. Hence, for all p 2
Ball(pD();7=8) = Vp and for all , 1  
Pn
j=1 j(p;)  1   sup2 supp2Vp
Pn
j=1 j(p;) = 1  
sup2 max() = 1  max(0) > 0 and j(p;)  inf2 infp2Vpmin1jn j(p;)  inf2 min() 
min(
00) > 0 for all 1  j  n. Set ~max = maxfmax; max(0)g; ~min = minfmin; min(00)g where
max and min are as dened in S2. Note that by S2, for p 2 f~p(1); : : : ; ~p(~q)g, 1 
Pn
j=1 j(p;) 
1   max  1   ~max and j(p;)  min  ~min for all 1  j  n and for all  2 . This com-
pletes the proof of the claim: if t t1, then pt 2 f~p(1); : : : ; ~p(n)g W(~min; ~max); if t1 < t <  , then
pt 2Ball(pD();7=8)W(~min; ~max).
Note that ^t 2 ^t is equivalent to pt 2 P which is immediately satised if pt 2
Ball(pD();7=8)  Ball(pD(); )  P (the last inequality follows by R4). This means that we
only need to show Ct  0 and pt 2 Ball(pD();7=8) for t1  t <  . Let V3  V2 be such that for
all k  V3 and z = 1; : : : ;Z,
 
2
p
 1+3

(log tz)
 =4 < =(8!). We now prove the result by induc-
tion. If   t1 + 1, then there is nothing to prove. Suppose that  > t1 + 1. Since E(t1)   on
A, by Lemma 1(a), pD(^1) 2 Ball(pD(); =2). For t = t1 + 1, we then have jjpt1+1   pD()jj2 =
jjpD(^1)  pD()jj2  =2, so pt1+1 2P. In addition, similar to Lemma EC.1, we also have Ct1+1 =
kC  LC +LC  ASL A(NT1 +^t1+1) (k L  1)C +LC  ASL A^t1+1  0 where the rst
inequality follows by the fact that ANT1 C, and the second inequality follows by the same argu-
ment as in Lemma EC.1. This is the base case. Now suppose Cs  0; ps 2 W(~min; ~max) for all
s t  1 for some t  1<  with t  1 2 [tz; tz+1). If t  , there is nothing to prove. So we only
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need to show that Ct  0; pt 2W(~min; ~max) when t <  . Note that when t <  , we have tz  t <  .
Hence, by denition of A, we have
jjpt  pD()jj2  jjpt  p(NTz ; ^tz)jj2+ jjp(NTz ; ^tz)  pD(^tz)jj2+ jjpD(^tz)  pD()jj2
 wjjQjj2


t 1X
s=t1+1
^s
k  s


2
+ jjp(NTz ; ^tz)  p(D(^tz); ^tz)jj2+

2
 
4
+!jjNTz  D(^tz)jj2+

2
 
4
+

8
+

2
=
7
8
where the second inequality follows by Lemma 1(a) and the fact that E(tz) <  on A, the last
inequality results from the following inequalityNTz  D(^tz)
2
 NTz  D()2+ D() D(^tz)2
 2
xNTz  xD(^tz)
2
+2
xD(^tz) xD()
2
+
D() D(^tz)
2
 2
p
 1(log tz)
  4 +3E(tz)


2
p
 1+3

(log tz)
  4 <

8!
;
where the second inequality follows by (EC.13) and the fourth inequality follows by the denition
of A. Hence, pt 2 Ball(pD();7=8). For Ct, by a similar argument to Lemma EC.1, we have
Ct = kC   tC + tC   ASL  
Pt
s=t1+1
A(NTz(s)   Q
Ps 1
v=t1+1
^v
k v + ^s)  (k   t)C + LC   ASL  Pt
s=t1+1
(A^s 
Ps 1
v=t1+1
A^v
k v ) 0. This completes the induction.
(c) Let V4  V3 be such that 272
 
54 [84+4(q  1)2(log tz)2]=(25tz)+ 2 1 2=(log tz 1) 2

< 1 for
all k  V4 and z = 1; : : : ;Z, where  2 =maxf1;4223g, 4 and 5 are as in Lemma 4. Again, we
show by induction. For z = 1, we have:
E[jjxD(^t1) xNT1 jj221ft1<gjA] =E[jjxD(^t1) D(^t1)jj221ft1<gjA]
 2E[jjxD(^t1) xD()jj221ft1<gjA] + 2E[jjD(^t1) D()jj221ft1<gjA]
 42 
2
3
t1
  2
t1
;
where the second to the last inequality follows by Lemma 2. This is our base case. We now do the
inductive step. Suppose that E[jjxD(^ts)  xNTs jj221fts<gjA]  2t 1s holds for s= z   1, we need
to show that same thing holds for s= z. Then, for k
1  V4, we have:
E
xD(^tz) xNTz 2
2
1ftz<g
A 2E xD(^tz) xNTz 14
2
1ftz<g
A
 272

E
xD(^tz) xD()4
2
1ftz<g
A+E xD() xD(^tz 1)4
2
1ftz<g
A
+E
xD(^tz 1) xNTz 14
2
1ftz<g
A
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 272

4E[E(tz)41ftz<gjA] + 4E [E(tz 1)41ftz<gjA] +
 1
(log tz 1)

2
 2
tz 1

 272

84+4(q  1)2(log tz)2
25t
2
z
4+
84+4(q  1)2(log tz 1)2
25t
2
z 1
4+
 1
(log tz 1)

2
2 2
tz

 272

54 [84+4(q  1)2(log tz)2]
25tz
+
2 1 2
(log tz 1)

2

1
tz
 1
tz
  2
tz
;
where the rst inequality follows by Lemma EC.6(a), the third inequality follows by Lemma EC.4,
Lemma EC.6(a) and the induction hypothesis, and the fourth inequality holds because
Lemma EC.6(b) shows that ps 2 W(~min; ~max) for s <  which means that the condition for
Lemma 4 is satised, so
E

E(t)41ft<g
A  Z 1
0
P

jj^t  jj42  x

dx

Z 1
0
min

1; 4t
q 1 exp
  5tpx	dx

Z  2(q 1) log t
5t
2
0
dx+
Z 1

2(q 1) log t
5t
2

4t
q 1 exp

 5t
p
x
2

exp

 5t
p
x
2

dx
 4(q  1)
2(log t)2
25t
2
+ 4
Z 1

2(q 1) log t
5t
2 exp

 5t
p
x
2

dx
 4(q  1)
2(log t)2
25t
2
+ 4
Z 1
0
exp

 5t
p
x
2

dx
 84+4(q  1)
2(log t)2
25t
2
:
This completes the induction. 
Proof of Lemma EC.7. We rst derive a bound for . By denition tz = d(tz+1 L)=2e+L for
z > 1, so tz L (tz+1 L)=2. This implies that tz+1  tz  tz for all z > 1. For z = 1, we also have
t2  t1 = 1L= t1. Recall that Z  dlog2 ke  2 log2 k. Thus, we can bound  as follows:
 =
k 1X
s=t1+1
(s)2 =
ZX
z=1
(tz+1  tz)(tz)2 
ZX
z=1
(tz+1  tz)26
(q  1) log tz +1
tz
 26Z[(q  1) logk+1]
 K[1+ logk+(q  1) log2 k]
for some positive constant K independent of k 1.
We now derive a bound for 	. To do that, we rst show that there exists a constant K > 3
such that for all k K, we have (1)(logk)1+=k < 1=19, (2)Z  3 and (3)tZ 2  k=3. Note that as
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k!1, we have (logk)1+=k! 0, Z!1 and tz+1  L!1 for z = Z   2;Z   1;Z. This implies
that tz   L = d(tz+1   L)=2e  2(tz+1   L)=3 for z = Z   2;Z   1;Z when k is large. Therefore,
there exists a constant K > 3 such that for all k  K, we have (logk)1+=k < 1=19, Z  3 and
tZ 2  827(tZ+1 L)+L= 827k+ 1927(logk)1+ < k3 .
Since (tz) = 6
p
[(q  1) log tz +1]=tz  6pq, we conclude that for k < K, 	  k(k6pq)2 
K326q. We now focus on the case when kK. Note that,
	 =
k 1X
t=t1+1
 
t 1X
s=t1+1
(s)
k  s
!2
 2
k 1X
t=t1+1
 
tZ 2X
s=t1+1
(s)
k  s
!2
+2
k 1X
t=tZ 2+1
0@ t 1X
s=tZ 2+1
(s)
k  s
1A2 :
(EC.14)
Since tZ 2 > k=4 (recall that tz+1  2tz and tZ+1 = k), we have (s)< 6
p
4[(q  1) logk+1]=k
for all s > tZ 2. So, for all kK, the second term in (EC.14) can be bounded by
826[1+ (q  1) logk]
k
k 1X
t=tZ 2+1
0@ t 1X
s=tZ 2+1
1
k  s
1A2  826[1+ (q  1) logk]
k
3kK	;2[1+ (q  1) logk]
for some positive constant K	;2 = 24
2
6 independent of kK, where the rst inequality follows by
a similar argument as in (EC.7) and kK > 3. As for the rst term in (EC.14), for all kK, we
have
2
k 1X
t=t1+1
 
tZ 2X
s=t1+1
(s)
k  s
!2
 2k
 
tZ 2X
s=t1+1
(s)
k  s
!2
 2k
0@Z 3X
z=1
tz+1  tz
k  tz+1 6
s
1+ (q  1) log tz
tz
1A2
 4k26
 
Z 3X
z=1
tz+1  tz
k  tz+1
s
1+ (q  1) logk
tz+1
!2
 4k26[1+ (q  1) logk]
 Z tZ 2
1
1
k x
r
1
x
dx
!2
 4k26[1+ (q  1) logk]
 
2 log(
p
2p
2 1)p
k
!2
 K	;1[1+ (q  1) logk]
where K	;1 = 16
2
6 log
2(
p
2p
2 1). The second inequality follows by Lemma 4. The third inequality
follows because tz+1  2tz. Note that the function f(x) = 1(k x)px is decreasing when x < k3 . Since
tZ 2 < k3 , the fourth inequality holds by integral approximation. The fth inequality follows byZ tZ 2
1
1
k x
r
1
x
dx=
1p
k
Z tZ 2
1

1p
k px +
1p
k+
p
x

d
p
x 2p
k
log
 p
k  1p
k ptZ 2
!

2 log(
p
2p
2 1)p
k
:
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Thus, we conclude that there exists some positive constant K	 independent of k  1 such that
	 maxf(K	;1+K	;2)[1+(q 1) logk];K326qg K	[1+(q 1) logk]. We complete the proof by
letting K3 =maxfK;K	g. 
Proof of Lemma EC.8. The proof of Lemma EC.8 is very similar to that of Lemma EC.2, with
some nontrivial twists. Per the proof of Lemma EC.2, we only need to bound P(  tjA). Note
that we have
P(  tjA)  P
 
max
L+1st
(SL LLek  s

2
+


sX
v=L+1
v
k  v


2
+
sX
v=L+1
jjv   ^vjj21fvg
k  v
)
 
A
!
 P

max
L+1st
SL LLek  s

2
  
2
A+P
 
max
L+1st


sX
v=L+1
v
k  v


2
  
4
A
!
+P
 
max
L+1st
sX
v=L+1
jjv   ^vjj21fvg
k  v 
 
4
A
!
 max

1;
4n(1+L)
2L2
 2(k  t)2

+
16
 2P(A)

4
(k  t)2 +
4
k  t

+P
 
max
L+1st
sX
v=L+1
jjv   ^vjj21fvg
k  v 
 
4
A
!
(EC.15)
where the last inequality follows by the same argument in Lemma EC.2. We now bound the last
term in (EC.15):
P
 
max
L+1st
sX
v=L+1
jjv   ^vjj21fvg
k  v 
 
4
A
!
 16
 2
0@ tX
s=L+1
q
E[jjs  ^sjj221fsgjA]
k  s
1A2
 16
 2
0@ tX
s=L+1
q
E[jjs  ^sjj221f<sgjA]
k  s +
q
E[jjs  ^sjj221f=sgjA]
k  s
1A2
 32
 2
0@ tX
s=L+1
q
E[jjs  ^sjj221f<sgjA]
k  s
1A2+ 32
 2
0@ tX
s=L+1
q
E[jjs  ^sjj221f=sgjA]
k  s
1A2
 32!
2
 2
 
tX
s=L+1
(s)
k  s
!2
+
32
 2
 
tX
s=L+1
p
2
p
E[1f=sgjA]
k  s
!2
 32!
2
 2
 
tX
s=L+1
(s)
k  s
!2
+
128
 2

1
k  t

where the rst inequality follows the same argument as in the proof of Lemma EC.2, the fourth
inequality follows by Lemma 4 and the fact that for any two points x1; x2 2n 1 we have jjx1  
x2jj22  2, and the last inequality follows because by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, 
tX
s=L+1
p
E[1f=sgjA]
k  s
!2

 
tX
s=L+1
1
(k  s)2
! 
tX
s=L+1
E[1f=sgjA]
!
 1
(k  t)2 +
1
k  t 
2
k  t
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Finally, we have for all kK 
2  3,
E[k   jA] =
k 1X
t=1
P(  tjA) 256
 2
logk
1 P(E(L)> ) +

4n(1+L)
2
 2
+1

L
+
32!2
 2
k 1X
t=1
 
tX
s=L+1
(s)
k  s
!2
+
128
 2
k 1X
t=1

1
k  t

 256
 2
logk
1 P(E(L)> ) +

4n(1+L)
2
 2
+1

L
+
64!2
 2
k 1X
t=1
 
t 1X
s=L+1
(s)
k  s
!2
+
64!2
 2
k 1X
t=1
(t)2
(k  t)2 +
128
 2
k 1X
t=1

1
k  t

 512
 2
logk+

4n(1+L)
2
 2
+1

L+
64K3!
2q
 2
logk+
128!226q
 2
+
128
 2
K7(logk+L)
whereK7 = 640= 
2+64K3!
2q= 2+128!226q= 
2+(4n(1+L)
2= 2+1), the rst inequality follows
by a similar argument as in Lemma EC.2, and the third inequality follows by Lemma EC.7 and
the fact that (t) 6pq. 
Proof of Lemma EC.9. Note that, for any 1; 2 2; 1 6= 2, by Fatou's lemma, we have
lim inf
0!1;00!2
Ht (
0; 00;DtjD1:t 1)
jj0  00jj22
= lim inf
0!1;00!2
X
Dt2D
q
P;0t (DtjD1:t 1) 
q
P;00t (DtjD1:t 1)
2
jj0  00jj22

X
Dt2D
lim inf
0!1;00!2
q
P;0t (DtjD1:t 1) 
q
P;00t (DtjD1:t 1)
2
jj0  00jj22
=
Ht (1; 2;DtjD1:t 1)
jj1  2jj22
> 0; (EC.16)
where the last inequality follows by W1. Let (:) denote the smallest eigenvalues of a real symmetric
matrix. If we now set 1 = 2 = , since
q
P;t (DtjD1:t 1) is continuously dierentiable in , there
exists ~ on the line segment connecting 0 and 00 such that
lim inf
0!;00!
Ht (
0; 00;DtjD1:t 1)
jj0  00jj22

X
Dt2D
lim inf
0!;00!

@
@
q
P;~t (DtjD1:t 1)
0
0  00
jj0  00jj2
2
=
X
Dt2D
lim inf
0!;00!
(0  00)0
jj0  00jj2

@
@
q
P;~t (DtjD1:t 1)

@
@
q
P;~t (DtjD1:t 1)
0
0  00
jj0  00jj2

X
Dt2D
lim inf
0!;00!


@
@
q
P;~t (DtjD1:t 1)

@
@
q
P;~t (DtjD1:t 1)
0
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=
X
Dt2D


@
@
q
P;t (DtjD1:t 1)

@
@
q
P;t (DtjD1:t 1)
0
=
X
Dt2D

 
( @
@
P;t (DtjD1:t 1))( @@P;t (DtjD1:t 1))0

4P;t (DtjD1:t 1)
=
1
4
X
Dt2D


@
@
logP;t (DtjD1:t 1)

@
@
logP;t (DtjD1:t 1)
0
P;t (DtjD1:t 1)
 cf
4
> 0 (EC.17)
where the rst inequality follows by Fatou's Lemma as in (EC.16) and the Mean Value Theorem,
and the third equality follows because
@
@
q
P;t (DtjD1:t 1) =
@
@
P;t (DtjD1:t 1)
2
q
P;t (DtjD1:t 1)
(by chain rule) and the last two inequalities follow by the denition of Fisher information and W2.
To prove Lemma EC.9, it suces to show that, for any 1; 2 2;Ht (1; 2;DtjD1:t 1)=jj1 2jj22 
ch for some ch > 0 independent of 1; 2. (If 1 = 2, the ratio is to be understood as its limit.)
Suppose not, since the ratio is always non-negative, there exists two sequences n1 ! 1; n2 ! 2
such that lim infn!1Ht (
n
1 ; 
n
2 ;DtjD1:t 1)=jjn1  n2 jj22 = 0. But, this contradicts with (EC.16) when
1 6= 2 and with (EC.17) when 1 = 2. This completes the proof. 
EC.3. Proof of results in Section 4
EC.3.1. Proof of Lemma 5
We rst show that L is a bounded linear operator. For all f 2 C0(P), there exists p
l
 xl  pl for
all l= 1; : : : ; n such that
jjLf(:)jj1 = sup
x2P
jLf(x)j= sup
x12[p1;p1]
: : : sup
xn2[pn;pn]
jL1      Lnf(x1; : : : ; xn)j
 sup
x12[p1;p1]
: : : sup
xn 12[pn 1;pn 1]
jL1      Ln 1f(x1; : : : ; xn)j(2s)s
 : : :  (2s)nsf(x1; : : : ; xn) (2s)nsjjf(:)jj1;
where the inequalities follow by Theorem EC.3. We now prove that Lf = f for all f 2

nl=1Ps 1[pl; pl]. Note that L= L1  L2      Ln. Applying Theorem EC.3 iteratively n times, we
obtain that Lf =L1      Lnf =L1      Ln 1f =   = f . 
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EC.3.2. Proof of Lemma 6
We will proceed in several steps.
Step 1
Let l := (pl   pl)=(d + 1). Fix some s  ~i1; : : : ;~in  s + d. Dene a hypercube H~i1;:::;~in := fp =
(p1; : : : ;pn) : yl;~il  pl  yl;~il+1;1 l ng. Note that for any p2H~i1;:::;~in ,
jj(p)  ~(p)jj1  jj(p) L(p)jj1+ jjL(p)  ~(p)jj1:
By Corollary EC.1 (see xEC.4.3), there exists f1 = (f1;1; : : : ;f1;n)2
nl=1P(s^s) 1[pl; pl] such that
jj(:)  f1(:)jj1 = sup
p2H~i1;:::;~in
jj(p)  f1(p)jj1 = sup
p2H~i1;:::;~in
max
1jn
jj (p)  f1;j(p)j
 sup
p2H~i1;:::;~in
max
1jn
(
Cn;(s^s)
nX
i=1

(s^s)
i j(@(s^s)=@p(s^s)i )j (p)j
)
 Cn;(s^s)W
nX
i=1

(s^s)
i ;
where Cn;(s^s) is a positive constant that only depends on n; s^ s and the last inequality follows
by assumption N2. Then,
jj(p) L(p)jj1  jj(p)  f1(p)jj1+ jjf1(p) Lf1(p)jj1+ jjLf1(p) L(p)jj1
= jj(p)  f1(p)jj1+ jjL((p)  f1(p))jj1  [1+ (2s)ns] jj(:)  f1(:)jj1
 Cn;(s^s)W [1+ (2s)ns]
 
nX
i=1

(s^s)
i
!
 nCn;(s^s)W [1+ (2s)ns]

max
1ln
fpl  plg
(s^s)
1
d(s^s)
;
where the rst equality and the second inequality follows by Lemma 5 (note that s^ s s). Also,
we have that for any 1 i1; : : : ; in  s+ d, 1 j  n,
i1;:::;inj   cji1;:::;in  sX
j1=1
j1X
r1=1
  
sX
jn=1
jnX
rn=1
 Qn
l=1 l;il;jl
 jj (1;i1;r1 ; : : : ; n;in;rn)  ~j(1;i1;r1 ; : : : ; n;in;rn)jQn
l=1
Qjl
sl=1;sl 6=rl(l;il;rl   l;il;rl)

sX
j1=1
j1X
r1=1
  
sX
jn=1
jnX
rn=1
Qn
l=1(
ls)
jl 1Qn
l=1(
l=s)jl 1
jj (1;i1;r1 ; : : : ; n;in;rn)  ~j(1;i1;r1 ; : : : ; n;in;rn)j

sX
j1=1
j1X
r1=1
  
sX
jn=1
jnX
rn=1
s2(
Pn
l=1 jl n)jj (1;i1;r1 ; : : : ; n;in;rn)  ~j(1;i1;r1 ; : : : ; n;in;rn)j


s+ s2
2
n
s2(ns n) ji1;:::;in ;
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where the second inequality follows by Theorem EC.5 (see xEC.4.3), and ji1;:::;in :=
max1r1;:::;rnsfjj (1;i1;r1 ; : : : ; n;in;rn)  ~j(1;i1;r1 ; : : : ; n;in;rn)jg. Hence:
jLj (p)  ~j(p)j 
s+dX
i1=1
  
s+dX
in=1
i1;:::;inj   cji1;:::;in  jNi1;:::;in(p)j


s+ s2
2
n
s2(ns n) max
1i1;:::;ins+d

ji1;:::;in
	
;
where the last inequality holds by Corollary EC.2 (see xEC.4.3). This implies: For all p2H~i1;:::;~in ,
there exists a constant C1n;s;s;P > 0 depending only on n; s; s;P such that jj(p)   ~(p)jj1 
C1n;s;s;P
 
Wd (s^s)+max1i1;:::;ins+d;1jn

ji1;:::;in
	
. Note that term after the inequality does not
depend on ~i1; : : : ;~in; so, we have:
jj(:)  ~(:)jj1  sup
p2P
jj(p)  ~(p)jj1 C1n;s;s;P
0@ W
d(s^s)
+ max
1i1;:::;ins+d
1jn

ji1;:::;in
	1A(EC.18)
Step 2
Following similar arguments as in Step 1, we now derive a bound for jjrj (:) r~j(:)jj1. Consider
the hypercube H~i1;:::;~in dened in Step 1. Note that jjrj (p) r~j(p)jj1  jjrj (p) Lrj (p)jj1+
jjLrj (p)   r~j(p)jj1. By Corollary EC.1 (see xEC.4.3), there exists f2 = (f2;1; : : : ;f2;n) 2

nl=1P(s^s) 1[pl; pl] such that for all p2H~i1;:::;~in , we have
jjrj (p) rf2;j(p)jj1  max
1jn
Cn;(s^s) 1
nX
i=1

(s^s) 1
i j(@(s^s)=@p(s^s)i )j (p)j Cn;(s^s) 1W
nX
i=1

(s^s) 1
i ;
where Cn;(s^s) 1 is a positive constant that only depends on n and (s^ s)  1. Then, we have
jjr(p) Lr(p)jj1  nCn;(s^s) 1W [1+ (2s)ns]

max
1ln
fpl  plg
(s^s) 1
d ((s^s) 1):
Now, by Corollary EC.3 (see xEC.4.3),
jjrNi1;:::;in(p)jj1  njjrNi1;:::;in(p)jj1  n(s  1) max
1ln
f  1l g  2n(s  1) max
1ln
f(pl  pl) 1gd:
This implies:
jjLrj (p) r~j(p)jj1 
s+dX
i1=1
  
s+dX
in=1
i1;:::;inj   cji1;:::;in  jjrNi1;:::;in(p)jj1
 2n

s+ s2
2
n
s2(ns n)(s+ d)n(s  1) max
1ln
f(pl  pl) 1gd max1i1;:::;ins+d

ji1;:::;in
	
:
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We conclude that there exists a constant C2n;s;s;P > 0 depending only on n; s; s;P such that
jj(r(:) r~(:))0jj1  max
1jn
sup
p2P
jjrj (p) r~j(p)jj1
 C2n;s;s;P
0@ W
d(s^s) 1
+ max
1i1;:::;ins+d
1jn

ji1;:::;in
	
d
1A : (EC.19)
Step 3
We now analyze max(i1;:::;in)2G;1jn

ji1;:::;in
	
. Let G = fp = (p1; : : : ;pn) 2 P : pl = l;il;rl ;1  il 
s+d;1 rl  s; l= 1; : : : ; ng. Then, max1i1;:::;ins+d

ji1;:::;in
	
=maxp2 G jj (p)  ~j(p)j. Note that,
for all x 0, we can bound
P

max
p2 G
jj (p)  ~j(p)j  x

 P

max
p2 G
f~j(p) j (p)g  x

+P

max
p2 G
fj (p)  ~j(p)g  x

We now bound the terms on the right hand side of the inequality separately. For any x 0; t 0,
P

max
p2 G
f~j(p) j (p)g  x

 exp( tx)E

exp

tmax
p2 G
f~j(p) j (p)g

 exp( tx)E
24exp
0@tX
p2 G
(~j(p) j (p))
1A35
 exp( tx)

max
p2 G
n
E
h
exp

t(~j(p) j (p))
iosn(s+d)n
:
Note that there exists a p 2 G such that the maximum is attained. So, for all 0 tL0:
max
p2 G
n
E
h
exp

t(~j(p) j (p))
io
= E
h
exp

t(~j(p
) j (p))
i
= exp( tj (p))E
"
exp
 
t
L0
L0X
i=1
Bin(j (p
))
!#
= exp( tj (p))

E

exp

t
L0
Bin(j (p
))
L0
= exp( tj (p))

1 j (p)+j (p) exp

t
L0
L0
 exp( tj (p))

exp

j (p
)

exp

t
L0

  1
L0
= exp( tj (p)) exp
 
j (p
)L0
1X
j=1
1
j!

t
L0
j!
= exp
 
j (p
)L0
1X
j=2
1
j!

t
L0
j!
 exp  j (p)t2=L0  exp(t2=L0);
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where the last inequality follows by the fact that
P1
j=2(j!)
 1 (t=L0)
j  (t=L0)2
P1
j=2[j(j   1)] 1 
(t=L0)
2
. Hence, we have that for all 0  t  L0, P(maxp2 Gf~j(p)   j (p)g  x)  exp(sn(s +
d)nt2=L0  tx). Following a similar argument, we can show that for all 0 tL0, there exists some
q 2 G such that
P

max
p2 G
fj (p)  ~j(p)g  x

 exp( tx)

max
p2 G
n
E
h
exp

t(j (p)  ~j(p))
iosn(s+d)n
 exp( tx)
"
exp(tj (q
)) exp
 
j (q
)L0
1X
j=1
( 1)j
j!

t
L0
j!#sn(s+d)n
 exp(sn(s+ d)nj (q)t2=L0  tx) exp(sn(s+ d)nt2=L0  tx):
Pick t=
p
L0s
 n=2(s+ d) n=2 logk (note that t=L0 = (L0sn(s+ d)n log
 2 k) 1=2 = (~L0 log
 2 k) 1=2 <
1) and x= 2L
 1=2
0 (s+ d)
n=2sn=2 logk, we then have for k 3:
P

max
p2 G
f~j(p) j (p)g 
2 logkp
L0
s
n
2 (s+ d)
n
2

 2exp    log2 k 2exp(  logk) = 2
k
:
Note that ~L0 = L0(s+ d)
nsn. Hence, L0 = ~L0s
 n(s+ d) n. Combine with the results derive in
Step 1 and 2, we then have that there exists constant C3n;s;s;P ;C
4
n;s;s;P depending on n; s; s;P only,
such that for all k 3:
P
 (:)  ~(:)
1
C3n;s;s;P
 
W
d(s^s)
+
2 logkp
~L0
dn
!!
 P
(:)  ~(:)
1
C1n;s;s;P

W
d(s^s)
+
2 logkp
L0
s
n
2 (s+ d)
n
2

 2
k
; and
P
 r(:) r~(:)0
1
C4n;s;s;P
 
W
d(s^s) 1
+
2 logkp
~L0
dn+1
!!
 P
r(:) r~(:)0
1
C2n;s;s;P

W
d(s^s) 1
+
2 logkp
L0
s
n
2 (s+ d)
n
2 d

 2
k
:
Let d = ( ~L0
 1=2
logk) 1=(s+n). We conclude that there exist constants M4;M5 independent of
k 3 such that for all k 3,
P
0@(:)  ~(:)
1
M4
 
logkp
~L0
! s^s
s+n
1A 2
k
and P
0B@r(:) r~(:)0
1
M5
 
logkp
~L0
! (s^s) 1
s+n
1CA 2
k
:

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EC.3.3. Proof of Lemma 7
By assumption,  := fx : x= (p); p2Pg is convex. Recall that by R1, (:) is invertible and its
inverse function p :  !P satises that (p(x)) = x;8x 2  . Let (p) := ~(p)  (p). Note
that jj(p)jj1  jj(p)  ~(p)jj1  jj(:)  ~(:)jj1 for all p 2 P. Since the optimal solution of P
is stationary, i.e., Dt = 
D for all t, we can formulate an equivalent \one-period" version P0, and
also construct an auxiliary optimization problem Pac :
(P0) r
D := max
2
r() s.t. A C
T
and
(Pac ) r
D := max
2
r() s.t. A+A(p()) C
T
:
Note that D = (pD) is the unique optimizer of P0. Let 
ac denote an optimizer of Pac (note
that ac may not be unique). By the strong concavity of r(:) as a function of , ac is the unique
optimizer of the following optimization problem whose optimal value remains to be rD:
(P
ac
 ) r
D := max
2
r() s.t. A C
T
 A(p(ac)):
Note that if we view the term A(p(ac)) on the right hand side of the inequality as a pertur-
bation of the term C=T in P 0, optimization (P
ac
 ) is equivalent to
(P0()) r
D() := max
2
r() s.t. A C
T
  ;
where = A(p(ac)). In light of Corollary EC.4 (see xEC.4.3), there exists a constant K13 > 0
independent of jjjj1 such that jjD   acjj1  K13jjjj1. Now, let ~P denote the optimization
problem: max2f~r() : s.t. A+A(p())C=Tg. Let  := (p). (This optimization problem
is emanated from ~P. The only dierence is that ~P optimizes over  instead of p as in ~P.) Since p
is an optimizer of ~P,  is an optimizer of ~P. Note that the constraints of ~P and P
ac
 are identical.
Thus,  is feasible to Pac and 
ac is feasible to ~P. By the optimality condition of P
ac
 and the
fact that r(:) is strongly concave with respect to  and the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix of
r(:) are bounded from above by  v, we have r() r(ac)+rr(ac)  ( ac)  v
2
jjac  jj22 
r(ac)  v
2
jjac  jj21 (here, we use the fact that rr(ac)  ( ac) 0, by the optimality of ac).
By the optimality condition of ~P, we have ~r(
ac) ~r(); so,
v
2
jjac  jj21  r(ac)  r()
 [r(ac)  ~r(ac)]  r()  ~r()
 jj(rr() r~r())0jj1jjac  jj1;
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for some , where the last inequality follows by Mean Value Theorem and norm inequality. This
indicates that jjac  jj1  2v 1jj(rr() r~r())0jj1. Since p(:) is continuously dierentiable
by R1 and  is compact, jjrp()jj1 is uniformly bounded by some constant K > 0. Note that
r() =   p() and ~r() = (+ (p()))  p(), so r()  ~r() = p()  (p()) and
jj(rr() r~r())0jj1 = jjrr() r~r()jj1
= jjrp() (p())+rp()rp(p())p()jj1
 jjrp()jj1jj(p())jj1+ jjrp()jj1jjrp(p())jj1jjp()jj1
 nKjj(:)  ~(:)jj1+nK
 
nX
l=1
pl
!
jjr(:) r~(:)jj1:
Finally, since p(:) is in C1() and  is compact, there exists some constant K 0 such that
jjpD   pjj1  K 0jjD   jj1. This implies jjpD   pjj1  K 0jjD   jj1  K 0(jjD   acjj1 +
jjac   jj1)K 0[K13jjjj1 + 2v 1nKjj(:)  ~(:)jj1 + 2v 1nK(
Pn
l=1 pl)jj(r(:) r~(:))0jj1]
M6maxfjj(:)  ~(:)jj1; jjr(:) r~(:)jj1g for M6 =K 0[K13+2v 1nK+2v 1nK(
Pn
l=1 pl)] that
is independent of jj(:)  ~(:)jj1 and jj(r(:) r~(:))0jj1. 
EC.3.4. Proof of Lemma 8
Recall that (~L0) := (logk=
p
~L0)
((s^s) 1)=(s+n). Dene = ((p) r(p)  p;r1(p); : : : ;rn(p)).
We rst bound P(jj  jj2 > (C1n;P +1)(~L0)) for some C1n;P dened later. Let E = fjjpD   pjj2 >p
nM6maxfM4;M5g(~L0)g. Since  = ((pD) r(pD) pD;r1(pD); : : : ;rn(pD)), by continu-
ity of (:) and r(:), there exists C1n;P  0 depending only on n and P such that, conditioning
on Ec, we have:
jj  jj22 =
(pD) r(pD)  pD (p)+r(p)  p2
F
+
r(pD) r(p)2
F
=
nX
i=1
 
i (p
D) 
nX
j=1
pDj
@i
@pj
(pD) i (p)+
nX
j=1
pj
@i
@pj
(p)
!2
+
nX
i=1
nX
j=1

@i
@pj
(pD)  @

i
@pj
(p)
2
 (C1n;P (~L0))2: (EC.20)
where the rst equality follows since for  = (a;B01; : : : ;B
0
n), jjjj22 = jjajj2F + jjBjj2F . By the law of
total probability, we have:
P
  
2
> (C1n;P +1)(~L0)

 P
  
2
> (C1n;P +1)(~L0)
EP(E)
+P
  
2
> (C1n;P +1)(~L0)
EcP(Ec)
 P(E)+P
  
2
> (C1n;P +1)(~L0)
Ec  4
k
(EC.21)
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where the last inequality follows by (EC.20) and the inequality below:
P(E)  P
p
n
pD  p1 >pnM6maxfM4;M5g(~L0)
 P
0B@pnM6maxfjj(:)  ~(:)jj1; jj(r(:) r~(:))0jj1g>pnM6maxfM4;M5g logkp
~L0
! (s^s) 1
s+n
1CA
 P
0@jj(:)  ~(:)jj1 >M4 logkp
~L0
! s^s
s+n
1A+P
0B@jj(r(:) r~(:))0jj1 >M5 logkp
~L0
! (s^s) 1
s+n
1CA 4
k
;
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 7, the third inequality follows by the union bound
and the fact that
p
~L0  log3=2 k > logk, and the last inequality follows by Lemma 6. We now
bound P(jj  ^jj>C2n;PmaxfM4;M5g(~L0)), for some C2n;P dened below. Note that there exists
a constant C2n;P > 0 depending only on n and P such that:
jj  ^jj22 =
(p) r(p)  p  ~(p)+r~(p)  p2
F
+
r(p) r~(p)2
F
 (C2n;Pmaxfjj(:)  ~(:)jj1; jjr(:) r~(:)jj1g)2:
So, we can bound:
P

jj  ^jj2 >C2n;PmaxfM4;M5g(~L0)

 P

C2n;Pmaxfjj(:)  ~(:)jj1; jj(r(:) r~(:))0jj1g>C2n;PmaxfM4;M5g(~L0)

 P

jj(:)  ~(:)jj1 >M4(~L0)

+P

jj(r(:) r~(:))0jj1 >M5(~L0)

 4
k
;(EC.22)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 6 and the fact that
p
~L0  log3=2 k > logk. Finally,
by combining (EC.21) and (EC.22) and letting M7 =C
1
n;P +C
2
n;PmaxfM4;M5g+1, we have
P

jj  ^jj2 >M7(~L0)

 P

jj  ~jj2 > (C1n;P +1)(~L0)

+P

jj~  ^jj2 >C2n;PmaxfM4;M5g(~L0)

 8
k
:

EC.3.5. Proof of Theorem 3
Throughout this section, we x = NLRC and assume that T = 1 (this is without lost of generality).
Let  be the minimum of k and the rst time t ~L0 + 1 such that the following condition (C1)
is violated:  > jjPt 1s=~L0+1 ~sk s jj2, where  :=q(~L0) = (k 1=4 log1=2 k)((s^s) 1)=(2s+n 1) and ~s =
s + 
(ps)   (ps; ^). Dene A := fjj   ^jj2 M7(~L0)g, where M7 and (~L0) are as dened
in Lemma 8. Note that, by Lemma 8, we have kP(Ac)  8; so, for all k  
3 = 17, P(Ac) < 1=2.
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Moreover, since (~L0) = o(1) (recall that ~L0  log3 k), there exists a constant 
4 > 0 independent
of k such that for all k
4 and all sample paths on A, we have jj  ^jj2 M7(~L0)<  where 
is as dened in Lemma 1. We will suppress the dependency of (~L0) on ~L0 for notational brevity
whenever there is no confusion. Now, dene t := 
(pt) and ^t := (pt; ^). As long as pt 2 P, we
have ^t = (pt; ^) = 
0(^) Pt 1s=1 Q ~sk s . Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we state two lemmas.
Lemma EC.10. There exists some constant 
5 > 0 independent of k such that for all k
5 and
for all sample paths on A, pt 2P and Ct  0 for all t <  .
Lemma EC.11. There exists some constant K9 independent of kmaxf
3;
4;
5g such that for
all kmaxf
3;
4;
5g, E[k   jA]K9(2k+  1 logk+  2)
Let R^(k) denote the revenue during exploitation stage. Since the one period revenue loss is
bounded by r, we have (k) ~L0r+
Pk
t=~L0+1
r(D) E [R^(k)] = ~L0r+
Pk
t=~L0+1
r(D()) 
E [R^(k)]. (Note that D = argmax2fr() :A Cg and D() = argmax2fr(;) :
ACg. Recall that by construction of , we have D = D().). The following result is useful
for bounding the revenue loss later.
Lemma EC.12. There exist some constant 
6 independent of k and some constant K10 > 0 inde-
pendent of k
6 and ^ such that for all k
6, jjD(^) 0(^)jj2 K10(~L0)2
Dene K := maxf
3;
4;
5;
6g. For k K;(k) rK. We now consider the case when k >K.
By similar arguments as in (EC.1) and (EC.2), we have that
kX
t=~L0+1
r(D()) E
h
R^(k)
i
 E
24  1X
t=~L0+1
rr(D())  (D() t)
A
35
+
v
2
E
24  1X
t=~L0+1
jjD() tjj22
A
35+ rE [k   jA] + 2 r + r kP(Ac) (EC.23)
Note that rr(D)  (D()  t) =rr(D();)  (D()  t) = D()0A(D()  D(^)+
D(^) 0(^)+0(^)  ^t+ ^t t). Therefore, for the rst term of (EC.23), we have for k <K:
E
24  1X
t=~L0+1
rr(D())  (D() t)
A
35=E
24  1X
t=~L0+1
D()0(AD() AD(^))
A
35
+E
24  1X
t=~L0+1
D()0(AD(^) A0(^))
A
35+E
24  1X
t=~L0+1
D()0A(0(^)  ^t+ ^t t)
A
35
 K10D()0Ae2k+E
24  1X
t=~L0+1
D()0
0@ t 1X
s=~L0+1
A ~s
k  s +At A
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 K10D()0Ae 2k+D()0Ae1+ kP

(Ac)
P(A)
+ jjD()jj2jjAjj2(E [k   jA] + 1)
 K10D()0Ae 2k+18D()0Ae+ jjD()jj2jjAjj2K9(2k+  1 logk+  2)+ jjD()jj2jjAjj2
 K11(1+ 2k+  1 logk+  2) (EC.24)
where K11 = (18 +K10)
D()0Ae + jjD()jj2jjAjj2(1 +K9), the rst inequality follows by the
fact that D()0A(D()  D(^)) on A (see the paragraph after (EC.3) for explanation) and
Lemma EC.12, the second inequality follows by a similar argument in the proof of Lemma 3, the
third inequality follows by Lemma EC.11 and the fact that  < 1.
We now bound the second term of (EC.23). A key observation is that there exists some constant
0 such that jj(pt)  (pt; ^)jj2 = jj(pD) +r(pD)  (pt   pD) + (pt   pD)0r2()(pt   pD) 
(pD;)   r(pD;)  (pt   pD)jj2 = jj(pt   pD)0r2()(pt   pD)jj2  0jjpt   pDjj22, where the
second equality follows by the construction of . So, conditioning on A, for all t <  ,
t  ^t
2
=
(pt) (pt; ^)
2
 jj(pt) (pt;)jj2+
(pt;) (pt; ^)
2
 0jjpt  pDjj22+!M7= 0jjpt  p0(^)+ p0(^)  pD(^)+ pD(^)  pD()jj22+!M7
 30jjpt  p0(^)jj22+30jjp0(^)  pD(^)jj22+30jjpD(^)  pD()jj22+!M7
 30jjrp(0(^); ^)jj22jjQjj22


t 1X
s=~L0+1
~s
k  s


2
2
+30!
2K210
4+30

n3=2M6!jj  ^jj2
2
+!M7
 30!2jjQjj22 2+30!2K2104+30n3M 26M 27!22+!M7 !0 (EC.25)
where !0 = 30!
2jjQjj2 + 30!2K210 + 30n3M 26M27!2 + !M7, the fourth inequality follows by
Lemma EC.12 and Lemma 7, and the fth inequality follows by the denition of  and A. We now
bound the second term in (EC.23) below.
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jA
35
 2vK12 logk+(2vK12+2vK210+2v2M 27 )2k
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where the last inequality follows because:
1
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2
2
jA
35+E
24  1X
t=~L0+1
^t t2
2
jA
35
 E
24  1X
t=~L0+1


t 1X
s=~L0+1
~s
k  s


2
jA
35+E
24  1X
t=~L0+1
^t t)2
2
jA
35
 2E
24  1X
t=~L0+1


t 1X
s=~L0+1
s
k  s


2
jA
35+2E
24  1X
t=~L0+1
0@ t 1X
s=~L0+1
jjs  ^sjj2
k  s
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2
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jA
35
 2
P(A)
E
24 1X
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t 1X
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24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t 1X
s=1
!0
k  s
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jA
35+!20k2
 32 logk+6!202k+!202kK12(logk+ 2k) =K12(logk+ 2k) (EC.26)
where K12 = 32+7!
2
0. Combine Lemma EC.11, (EC.23), (EC.24) and (EC.26), we have that there
exists some constant M8 > 0 independent of k >K such that for all k >K,
kX
t=~L0+1
r(D()) E
h
R^(k)
i
 M8

(~L0)
2k+ (~L0)
 1 logk+ (~L0)
 2

Putting things together, we then conclude that there exists some constant M9 independent of
k >K such that for all k >K:
(k)  M8
264k log2 k~L0
 (s^s) 1
s+n
+ logk
 p
~L0
logk
! (s^s) 1
s+n
+

k
log2 k
 (s^s) 1
2s+n 1
375+ r~L0
 M8

k
2s (s^s)+n
2s+n 1 (logk)
2((s^s) 1)
2s+n 1 + k
(s^s) 1
2(2s+n 1) (logk)
2s (s^s)+n
2s+n 1 + k
(s^s) 1
2s+n 1

+ rk
s+n
2s+n 1 (logk)
2(s 1)
2s+n 1
 M9k
2s (s^s)+n
2s+n 1 logk
where the last inequality holds by letting ~L0 = k
(s+n)=(2s+n 1)(logk)2(s 1)=(2s+n 1). The result then
follows by letting M3 =M9+ rK. 
EC.3.6. Proof of supporting lemmas
Proof of Lemma EC.10. Let 
5 = maxf
4;C1;C2g where C1 and C2 are constants to be
dened later. Assume without loss of generality that T = 1. Recall that pD = argmaxp2Pfr(p) :
A(p)  Cg = argmaxp2Pfr(p;) : A(p;)  Cg and pD(^) = argmaxp2Pfr(p; ^) : A(p; ^) 
Cg. Note that for k  
5  
4, we have jj   ^jj2 < . Hence, by Lemma 1(a), we conclude that
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jjpD   pD(^)jj2 <=2. Recall that p0(^) = argmaxp2Pfr(p; ^) :A(p; ^)C~L0=(k  ~L0)g. Since C  
C~L0=(k  ~L0) = (~L0C  AS~L0)=(k  ~L0)! 0 as k!1, by a similar argument as in Lemma EC.12,
there exists C1 > 0 independent of ^ 2 Ball(; ) such that for all k C1, jjpD(^)  p0(^)jj2 <=8.
Since !jjQjj2 = !jjQjj2
q
(~L0)! 0 as k!1, there exists a constant C2 > C1 such that for all
k  C2, !jjQjj2  =4. The rest of the proof goes by induction. Fix some k  
5. If   ~L0 + 1,
there is nothing to prove. Suppose  > ~L0 + 1. p~L0+1 = p
0(^) 2 Ball(pD;5=8)  P. Following the
same argument in the proof of Lemma EC.1, we have C~L0+1  0. This is our induction base. Sup-
pose that Cs  0; ps 2P for all s= ~L0+1; ~L0+2; : : : ; t 1 and t 1<  . If t  , we have nished the
induction. Otherwise, jjpt   p0(^))jj2 = jjrp(0(^); ^) 
Pt 1
s=~L0+1
Q ~s
k s jj2  !jjQjj2jj
Pt 1
s=~L0+1
~s
k s jj2 
!jjQjj2  =4 where the last inequality follows as k
5 C2. So pt 2Ball(pD;7=8)P. Ct  0
can be show in the same way as in the proof of Lemma EC.1. This completes the induction. 
Proof of Lemma EC.11. Assume without loss of generality that T = 1 and x k 
maxf
3;
4;
5g. Similar to (EC.15) in the proof of Lemma EC.8, we have
E [k   jA] =
k 1X
t=1
P(  tjA)
k 1X
t=1
P
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~L0+1st
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k  v
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jjv   ^vjj21fv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k  v
9=;  2
A
1A : (EC.27)
By the argument in the proof of Lemma EC.8, the rst term in (EC.27) can be bounded by
  2C1 logk=C1(~L0) 1 logk for some constant C1 independent of kmaxf
3;
4;
5g (note that
k
3 = 17> 3). We now bound the second term in (EC.27):
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2 log4
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(EC.28)
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where the third inequality follows by (EC.25) and the fact that jjt  ^tjj22  2, and the last equality
follows since  =
q
(~L0). Note that
Pk 1
t=1 log
s( k
k t) s!k for some constant Ms only depending on
s, there exists some constant C2 independent of kmaxf
3;
4;
5g such that:
k 1X
t=1
P
0@ max
~L0+1st
8<:
sX
v=~L0+1
jjv   ^vjj21fvg
k  v
9=;  2
A
1A

k 1X
t=1
128!40(~L0)
2 log4

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k  t

+512(~L0)
 2
k 1X
t=1

1
k  t
4
C2

(~L0)
2k+ (~L0)
 2

Therefore, we have that for all k maxf
3;
4;
5g, E[k    jA]  C1(~L0) 1 logk + C2(~L0)2k +
C2(~L0)
 2  K9((~L0)2k + (~L0) 1 logk + (~L0) 2) for some constant K9 independent of k 
maxf
3;
4;
5g. 
Proof of Lemma EC.12.Without loss of generality, assume T = 1. Dene ^ =C kC~L0=(k  ~L0).
Note that ~L0=k! 0 as k!1. Hence, there exists some constant 
6 
4 such that for all k
6,
jj^jj1 =
C   C~L0k  ~L0

1
=

(kC   ~L0C)  (kC  AS~L0)k  ~L0


1
=

AS~L0   ~L0Ck  ~L0


1
 2 (jjAejj1+ jjCjj1)
~L0
k
= 2(jjAejj1+ jjCjj1)

log2 k
k
 s 1
2s+n 1
 2 (jjAejj1+ jjCjj1) (~L0)2
where the rst inequality follows since k   ~L0 > k=2 for large k. Note that 0(^) =
argmax2
^
fr(; ^) : A  C~L0=(k   ~L0)g and D(^) = argmax2^fr(; ^) : A  Cg. Hence, by
Corollary EC.4, there exists a constantM^ independent of ^ but dependent on ^ such that jj0(^) 
D(^)jj1 M^ jj^jj1 = 2(jjAejj1+ jjCjj1)M^(~L0)2. Note that, as we will show below, both 0()
and D() are continuous in . This indicates that M can be chosen to be continuous in  for
all  2. The result is then proven by letting K10 = 2(jjAejj1 + jjCjj1) sup2M <1. We now
prove the continuity of 0() and D() below.
Recall that by Lemma 7 and the argument in Lemma 1, pD() is continuous in . Since p0() =
argmaxp2Pfr(p;) :A(p;)C+ ^g, by a similar argument we have that p0() is also continuous
in  for all ^. Note that 0() = (p0();) and D() = (pD();) and (p;) is continuous in
both p and . Therefore, both 0() and D() are continuous in . 
EC.4. Auxiliary Results
EC.4.1. Results for Maximum Likelihood Theory
Theorem EC.1. (Tail Inequality for MLE Based on IID Samples, Theorem 36.3 in
Borovkov (1999)) Let  2 Rq be compact and convex, and let fP :   g be a family of dis-
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tributions on a discrete sample space Y. Suppose Y is a random variable taking value in Y with
distribution P, and the following conditions hold:
(i) P 6= P0 whenever  6= 0;
(ii) For some r > q, sup2E[jjr logP(Y )jjr2] =  <1;
(iii) The function !pP(Y ) is dierentiable on  for any Y 2Y;
(iv) The Fisher information matrix, whose (i; j)th entry is given by E
h
  @2
@i@j
logP(Y )
i
, is
positive denite.
If Y1; Y2; ::: is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables taking value in Y with distribution P, and
^(t) = argmax2
Qt
l=1 P(Yl) is the maximum likelihood estimate based on t i.i.d. samples, then,
there exist constants 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 depending only on r, q, P and  such that for all t 1 and
all  0;P(jj^(t)  jj2 > ) 1 exp( t22).
EC.4.2. Results for Newton's Method
Theorem EC.2. (Quadratic Convergence of Newton's Method for Convex Uncon-
strained Optimization Problems, Section 9.5.3 in Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004))
Suppose g(z) is a concave function whose unconstrained optimizer is x. Let fx(k)g1k=1 be a sequence
of points obtained by Newton's method. Assume there exist positive constants m;M;L such that
(i) jjr2g(z) r2g(y)jj2 Ljjz  yjj2, and
(ii)  MI r2g(z) mI.
Then, there exists constant =minf1;3(1 2)gm2=L where 2 (0;0:5) such that if jjrg(x(k))jj2 <
, then jjrg(x(k+1))jj2  L2m2 jjrg(x(k))jj22.
EC.4.3. Results for Spline Approximation
Theorem EC.3. (Theorem 6.18 and Theorem 6.22 in Schumaker (2007)) Let B([p
l
; pl])
be the set of bounded functions on [p
l
; pl]. Then for l = 1; : : : ; n;Ll is a linear operator mapping
B([p
l
; pl]) into Sl(Gl; s). Moreover, Llf = f for all f 2 Ps 1([pl; pl]). In addition, for every g 2
C0([p
l
; pl]), jj(Llg)(:)jj1  (2s)sjjg(:)jj1.
Theorem EC.4. (Theorem 13.20 in Schumaker (2007)) Let  be a complete set of multiple-
indices and let 0< < 1. Then there exists a constant C depending only on n; ; ; such that for
all f 2 L@p (
),
jjD(f  T f)jjq C1=q 1=p
X
2@( )
jjDDf jjp
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for any  and for all 1 q p1 satisfying maxfbjj=dc;1=q 1=p+ jj=d;minf1 1=p;1=qgg
for all 2 @( ).
(Note: For denition of complete multiple-indices  and its boundary @, see Denition 13.15
on pg. 510 of Schumaker (2007). For the Sobolev Space Lp (
), see Denition 13.3 on pg.504 of
Schumaker (2007). See (13.34) for the denition of the tensor Taylor expansion T f , and (13.48)
for the denition of . Finally, see (13.9) - (13.12) for denitions of jj; , and D. )
Corollary EC.1. Let f : Rn ! [0;1]n be a function that satises N1-N2. Then for any s  3,
there exists g 2
nl=1P(s^s) 1([pl; pl]) such that:
jj(r
x
1
1 ;:::;x
n
n
)(f   g)(:)jj1 C
nX
i=1

(s^s) i
i

 @(s^s)@p(s^s)i f(:)


1
for 0 = 1 =   = n and 1 = 1 =   = n.
Proof. This result follows by Theorem EC.4. Let  = f = (1; : : : ; n) 2 Zn+ : 0  i  (s ^ s) 
1;1 i ng for s 3 and 
=H~i1;:::;~in . Also, let p=1; q=1. Note that for all j, s^s j  1 since
s 2 by N1 and s 3 and j  1 for all j. This ensures that there exists some 2 (0;1) such that
maxfbjj=nc;1=q 1=p+ jj=n;minf 1=p;1=qgg=max1jnf((s^ s) j)=ng for all 2 @=
f(s^ s  j)ej : 1 j  ng. Since 
 is a compact set and N2 ensures that for f , all its derivatives
of order (s; : : : ; s) or lower are uniformly bounded, we conclude that f 2 L(s^s;:::;s^s)1 (H~i1;:::;~in). The
result follows by letting g= T f 2
nl=1P(s^s) 1([pl; pl]). 
Theorem EC.5. (Lemma 6.19 in Schumaker (2007)) For fl;i;jgn;s+d;sl=1;i=1;j=1, we have jl;i;jj 
(yl;i+s  yl;i)j 1  (s l)j 1.
Theorem EC.6. (Theorem 12.4 in Schumaker (2007)) Let Yi1;:::;in = 
nl=1(yl;il ; yl;il+s) for
all 1  i1; : : : ; in  s + d. Then, Ni1;:::;id(p) > 0 for p = (p1; : : : ; pn) 2 Yi1;:::;in, Ni1;:::;id(p) = 0 for
p= (p1; : : : ; pn) =2 Yi1;:::;in, and
Pi1
v1=i1+s 1   
Pin
vn=in+s 1Nv1;:::;vn(p) 1 for p2 Yi1;:::;in.
Corollary EC.2. We have that
Ps+d
i1=1
  Ps+din=1 jNi1;:::;in(p)j= 1 for all p2P.
Proof. Let Yi1;:::;in = 
nl=1(yl;il ; yl;il+s) for all 1  i1; : : : ; in  s + d. By Theorem EC.6,Pi1
v1=i1+1 s   
Pin
vn=in+1 sNv1;:::;vn(p)  1 for p 2 Yi1;:::;in . Since in addition, we also have
by the same Theorem that Ni1;:::;in(p) > 0 for p = (p1; : : : ; pn) 2 Yi1;:::;in , and Ni1;:::;in(p) =
0 for p = (p1; : : : ; pn) =2 Yi1;:::;in . We thus conclude that
Ps+d
i1=1
  Ps+din=1 jNi1;:::;in(p)j =Ps+d
i1=1
  Ps+din=1Ni1;:::;in(p) =Pi1v1=i1+1 s   Pinvn=in+1 sNv1;:::;vn(p)  1 for p 2 Yi1;:::;in for all 1 
i1; : : : ; in  s+ d. The result then follows. 
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Theorem EC.7. (Theorem 4.22 in Schumaker (2007)) Fix l= 1; : : : ; n, and let s 2. Suppose
k and pl are such that yl;k  pl < yl;k+1, and dene il;k;j = minf(yl;v+j; yl;v) : yl;il  yl;v  yl;k <
yl;k+1  yl;v+j  yl;il+sg, for j = 1; : : : ; s. Suppose  > 0 and that il;k;s +1 > 0. Then jDN sl;il(pl)j 
 s;=(
Q
q=1il;l;s q) where  s; =
(s 1)!
(s  1)!


b=2c

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Corollary EC.3. jjrNi1;:::;in(p)jj1  (s  1)maxnl=1f  1l g for all p2P.
Proof. The result is a direct corollary of Theorem EC.7. Let  = 1, and then we have that for
pl 2 [yl;k; yl;k+1), jrplN sl;il(pl)j  (s 1)=il;k;s 1  (s 1)= l, where the last inequality follows since
il;k;s 1  l. Since (s  1)= l does not depend on k, we conclude that jrplN sl;il(pl)j  (s  1)= l
for all pl 2 [pl; pl]. Hence, jjrNi1;:::;in(p)jj1 =maxnl=1 jrilN sl;il(p)j  (s  1)maxnl=1f  1l g. 
EC.4.4. Results for Stability Analysis of Optimization Problems
Consider a family of parameterized nonlinear programs as follows:
(Pu) minx2Rn f(x;u)
s:t: gi(x;u) = 0; i= 1; : : : ; k;
gi(x;u) 0; i= k+1; : : : ; p;
with u 2 U  Rq being the parameter vector. When u = u0, the above problem Pu0 is called
the unperturbed problem. The Lagrangian function associated with Pu is L(x;;u) := f(x;u) +Pp
i=1 igi(x;u), and they denote by M(x;u) the set of Lagrange multipliers at a point x for (Pu).
They denote by I(x;u) the set of inequality constraints active at x. Let d 2Rq and dene u(t) :=
u0+ td.
Definition EC.1. (Definition 3.2 in Bonnans and Shapiro (2000)) For  0; u2 U , we say
that x(u) is an -optimal solution of (Pu) if x(u) is feasible and f(x;u) infx2Rn f(x;u)+ .
Definition EC.2. (Gollan's Condition, (5.111) in Bonnans and Shapiro (2000))We say
that Gollan's condition holds in direction d2Rq if the following holds:
(a) rxgi(x0; u0); i= 1; : : : ; k, are linearly independent,
(b) 9h2Rn such that rgi(x0; u0)  (h;d) = 0; i= 1; : : : ; k; and rgi(x0; u0)  (h;d)< 0; i2 I(x0; u0).
The following is a stronger condition of the Strong Second Order Sucient Optimality Condition
in (5.120) in Bonnans and Shapiro (2000). In other words, if the following holds, then Strong
Second Order Sucient Optimality Condition holds automatically.
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Definition EC.3. We say that a stronger strong second order sucient optimality condition
holds in a direction d if sup2Rq h
0r2xxL(x0; ;u0)h> 0;8h2Rnnf0g.
We now state their main sensitivity result for parameterized nonlinear programs.
Theorem EC.8. (Theorem 5.53(a) in Bonnans and Shapiro (2000)) Suppose that:
(i) the unperturbed problem (Pu0) has unique optimal solution x0,
(ii) Gollan's condition holds in the direction d,
(iii) the set M(x0; u0) of Lagrange multipliers is nonempty,
(iv) the strong second order sucient conditions are satised,
(v) for all t > 0 small enough the feasible set of (Pu(t)) is nonempty and uniformly bounded.
Then for any o(t2)-optimal solution x(t) of (Pu(t)), where t 0, x(t) is Lipschitz stable at x0, i.e.,
jjx(t) x0jj=O(t).
Corollary EC.4. Consider P(): J
D :=max2fr() : s:t:;AC=T  g. Denote by x() the
optimal solution to P(). Then, jjx(0)  x()jj1 =K13jjjj1 for some positive K13 independent
of jjjj1.
Proof.We now verify the conditions (i)-(v) for P(). For the unperturbed problem P(0), by strict
concavity assumption, we conclude that it has a unique optimal solution x(0) and thus (i) holds.
For (ii), note that we don't have equality constraints, so we only need to verify the second part
of (b) in Denition EC.2, which immediately follows because the derivative of those constraints
are a subset of the rows of A which are linearly independent. Note also that the constraints do
not depend on . So what we have showed is that Gollan's condition holds for all direction d. (ii)
holds. By duality theory of convex optimization, there exists Lagrange multipliers (0), so (iii)
holds. Note that rL(x(0); (0); ) =rr(x(0)) is negative denite by the strict concavity
assumption of the revenue function. Note that our problem is a maximization problem whereas
Theorem EC.8 is for minimization problems, so (iv) holds. Because the feasible set of P() is
nonempty and uniformly bounded, and the feasible set doesn't depend on , so (v) holds. The
optimal solution of P() is denitely o(t
2)-optimal to P(). Hence, Lipschitz continuity holds for
the optimal solution. 
